Learning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable?
| dc.contributor.author | Koray, S. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Saglam, I. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-08T10:14:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-02-08T10:14:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1545-2921 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/23488 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information about his private type. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
| dc.source.title | Economics Bulletin | en_US |
| dc.title | Learning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable? | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
| dc.citation.spage | 1 | en_US |
| dc.citation.epage | 10 | en_US |
| dc.citation.volumeNumber | 3 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issueNumber | 12 | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Economics Bulletin | en_US |
