Learning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable?
Date
2007
Authors
Koray, S.
Saglam, I.
Editor(s)
Advisor
Supervisor
Co-Advisor
Co-Supervisor
Instructor
BUIR Usage Stats
1
views
views
6
downloads
downloads
Series
Abstract
We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information about his private type.
Source Title
Economics Bulletin
Publisher
Economics Bulletin
Course
Other identifiers
Book Title
Keywords
Degree Discipline
Degree Level
Degree Name
Citation
Permalink
Published Version (Please cite this version)
Collections
Language
English
Type
Article