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dc.contributor.authorBogdan, R. J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:12:34Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:12:34Z
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/23350
dc.description.abstractSelf-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one's own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one's own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one's own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleSyntheseen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9206-5en_US
dc.subjectAttitudesen_US
dc.subjectSelf-ascriptionsen_US
dc.subjectSelf-regulationen_US
dc.subjectSimulationen_US
dc.subjectThoughtsen_US
dc.titleInside loops: developmental premises of self-ascriptionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage235en_US
dc.citation.epage251en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber159en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11229-007-9206-5en_US


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