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dc.contributor.authorGonzalez, R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHasker, K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSickles, R. C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:02:58Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:02:58Z
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.issn0217-5908
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/22654
dc.description.abstractA relatively new type of panel data analysis is becoming more and more topical in the applied econometrics literature as auction mechanisms are being explored in more depth. The typical data utilized in such studies involves repeated measures of auction outcomes, where the variable of interest involves order statistics from the sample of bids from many bids on completed auctions for a particular commodity. This article presents structural estimates of bidding behavior in eBay computer monitor auctions. We exploit characteristics of such repeated measures to analyze the efficiency of private value auctions for a relatively homogeneous good, computer monitors sold on eBay. We discuss how outcomes of the auction mechanism can be analyzed and their equilibrium outcomes assessed and evaluate the consumer surplus that is generated from such auctions. Particular attention is given to the collection of the eBay data from data recovery protocols that monitor in real time and in relative detail, characteristics of a particular auction with heterogeneity controls for different types of monitors and for different reputation effects of the auctioneer. Among other findings, our results point to a rejection of the use of Jump Bidding (Avery, 1998) or "Snipe or War" bidding (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002). We also find that longer auctions only have a small effect on price and experienced auctioneers respond to this incentive. © 2009 World Scientific Publishing Company.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleSingapore Economic Reviewen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1142/S0217590809003422en_US
dc.subjectEnglish auctionsen_US
dc.subjectInternet auctionsen_US
dc.subjectSimulated nonlinear least squaresen_US
dc.subjectStructural econometricsen_US
dc.subjectCommodity marketen_US
dc.subjectEconometricsen_US
dc.subjectEstimation methoden_US
dc.subjectIncentiveen_US
dc.subjectInterneten_US
dc.subjectLeast squares methoden_US
dc.subjectPanel dataen_US
dc.titleAn analysis of strategic behavior in eBAY auctionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage441en_US
dc.citation.epage472en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber54en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1142/S0217590809003422en_US
dc.publisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1793-6837


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