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dc.contributor.authorÖzyıldırım, Süheylaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:55:35Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:55:35Z
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.issn0219-0915
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/22104
dc.description.abstractThis paper models the effect of bank competition and deposit insurance premiums on the spread between lending and deposit rates. In developing economies, low spreads do not always indicate bank efficiency; they may be the result of high risk taking. This paper shows that imposing upper and lower limits on banks' spreads and adjusting deposit insurance premiums when violation of these limits occurs leads to a more stable but relatively large intermediation costs. In developing economies, such an outcome would be considered more desirable because it insulates existing financial intermediaries and investors against macroeconomic disturbances.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleReview of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policiesen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219091510002050en_US
dc.subjectDeposit marketen_US
dc.subjectFinancial stabilityen_US
dc.subjectInsurance premiumen_US
dc.subjectIntermediation spreaden_US
dc.subjectBankingen_US
dc.subjectCompetition (economics)en_US
dc.subjectDeveloping worlden_US
dc.subjectFinancial marketen_US
dc.subjectFinancial systemen_US
dc.subjectInsurance systemen_US
dc.subjectMacroeconomicsen_US
dc.titleIntermediation spread, bank supervision, and financial stabilityen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculty of Business Administrationen_US
dc.citation.spage517en_US
dc.citation.epage537en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber13en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1142/S0219091510002050en_US
dc.publisherWorld Scientific Publishingen_US


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