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dc.contributor.authorAlexander, J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:54:03Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:54:03Z
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.issn0143-781X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21996
dc.description.abstractThis article attempts to make sense of Oakeshott's enigmatic comment in On Human Conduct that it was perhaps injudicious of Hegel to use the word state in the Philosophy of Right for his conception of a bounded association. But the article does not confine itself to making sense of Oakeshott's meaning: it compares Oakeshott's conception of societas to Hegel's conception oí der Staat, Oakeshott's conception of philosophy as an unconditional consideration of conditional objects with Hegel's conception of philosophy as a reflexive consideration of the rationality immanent within unconditional objects, and Oakeshott's avoidance of divinity with Hegel's involvement in it. It is part of the purpose of this article to illustrate the suggestion that conceptions of God and conceptions of the state are closely related in the thought of both philosophers -and possibly in all philosophy: and that the problem of the state is therefore a problem as much religious as secular.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleHistory of Political Thoughten_US
dc.titleOakeshott on Hegel's 'injudicious' use of the word 'state'en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Political Science and Public Administrationen_US
dc.citation.spage147en_US
dc.citation.epage176en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber32en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.publisherImprint Academicen_US


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