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dc.contributor.authorAkin, S.N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPlatt, B.C.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSertel, M.R.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:53:04Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:53:04Z
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.issn14344742en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21918
dc.description.abstractThis study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Predonations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one's utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution; moreover, when the agents' preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleReview of Economic Designen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0106-7en_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectConcessionen_US
dc.subjectKalai-Smorodinsky solutionen_US
dc.subjectPre-donationen_US
dc.titleThe n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donationsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.citation.spage147en_US
dc.citation.epage162en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber15en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-010-0106-7en_US


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