Reichenbach and weyl on apriority and mathematical applicability

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Author
Berkovski, S.
Date
2011Journal Title
Synthese
Print ISSN
0039-7857
Volume
181
Issue
1
Pages
63 - 77
Language
English
Type
Article
Metadata
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http://hdl.handle.net/11693/21869Abstract
I examine Reichenbach's theory of relative a priori and Michael Friedman's interpretation of it. I argue that Reichenbach's view remains at bottom conventionalist and that one issue which separates Reichenbach's account from Kant's apriorism is the problem of mathematical applicability. I then discuss Hermann Weyl's theory of blank forms which in many ways runs parallel to the theory of relative a priori. I argue that it is capable of dealing with the problem of applicability, but with a cost.