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dc.contributor.authorBakır, N. O.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:52:12Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:52:12Z
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.issn0254-5330
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21865
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a game theoretic model that analyzes resource allocation strategies against an adaptive adversary to secure cargo container transportation. The defender allocates security resources that could interdict an unauthorized weapon insertion inside a container. The attacker observes the defender's security strategy and chooses a site to insert the weapon. The attacker's goal is to maximize the probability that the weapon reaches its target. The basic model includes a single container route. The results in the basic model suggest that in equilibrium the defender should maintain an equal level of physical security at each site on the cargo container's route. Furthermore, the equilibrium levels of resources to interdict the weapon overseas increase as a function of the attacker's capability to detonate the weapon remotely at a domestic seaport. Investment in domestic seaport security is highly sensitive to the attacker's remote detonation capability as well. The general model that includes multiple container routes suggests that there is a trade-off between the security of foreign seaports and the physical security of sites including container transfer facilities, container yards, warehouses and truck rest areas. The defender has the flexibility to shift resources between non-intrusive inspections at foreign seaports and physical security of other sites on the container route. The equilibrium is also sensitive to the cost effectiveness of security investments.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleAnnals of Operations Researchen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0793-zen_US
dc.subjectBorder securityen_US
dc.subjectContainer securityen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectPort securityen_US
dc.subjectRisk analysisen_US
dc.subjectTerrorismen_US
dc.titleA Stackelberg game model for resource allocation in cargo container securityen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Industrial Engineeringen_US
dc.citation.spage5en_US
dc.citation.epage22en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber187en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10479-010-0793-zen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.identifier.eissn1572-9338


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