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dc.contributor.authorAranyosi, I.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:51:12Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:51:12Z
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.issn0007-0882
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21793
dc.description.abstractIn this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl's notion of a 'nomological dangler' in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being 'anomic danglers' (not even nomically correlated) and 'necessary danglers' (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental-physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Scienceen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr001en_US
dc.titleA new argument for mind-brain identityen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage489en_US
dc.citation.epage517en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber62en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/bjps/axr001en_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US


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