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      Centralized and decentralized management of groundwater with multiple users

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      Author
      Saleh, Y.
      Gürler, Ü.
      Berk, E.
      Date
      2011
      Source Title
      European Journal of Operational Research
      Print ISSN
      0377-2217
      Electronic ISSN
      1872-6860
      Publisher
      Elsevier
      Volume
      215
      Issue
      1
      Pages
      244 - 256
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
      Item Usage Stats
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      Abstract
      In this work, we investigate two groundwater inventory management schemes with multiple users in a dynamic game-theoretic structure: (i) under the centralized management scheme, users are allowed to pump water from a common aquifer with the supervision of a social planner, and (ii) under the decentralized management scheme, each user is allowed to pump water from a common aquifer making usage decisions individually in a non-cooperative fashion. This work is motivated by the work of Saak and Peterson [14], which considers a model with two identical users sharing a common aquifer over a two-period planning horizon. In our work, the model and results of Saak and Peterson [14] are generalized in several directions. We first build on and extend their work to the case of n non-identical users distributed over a common aquifer region. Furthermore, we consider two different geometric configurations overlying the aquifer, namely, the strip and the ring configurations. In each configuration, general analytical results of the optimal groundwater usage are obtained and numerical examples are discussed for both centralized and decentralized problems.
      Keywords
      OR in natural resources
      Game theory
      Water resources management
      Darcy’s Law
      Darcy's law
      OR in natural resources
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/21716
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.048
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      • Department of Industrial Engineering 677
      • Department of Management 551
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