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dc.contributor.authorKörpeoǧlu, E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorŞen, A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGüler, K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:48:37Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:48:37Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.issn1432-2994
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21601
dc.description.abstractWe study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be financed with the private contributions of participating firms. We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleMathematical Methods of Operations Researchen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-011-0375-0en_US
dc.subjectEconomic order quantityen_US
dc.subjectJoint replenishmenten_US
dc.subjectNon-cooperative gamesen_US
dc.subjectPrivate contributionsen_US
dc.titleA private contributions game for joint replenishmenten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Industrial Engineering
dc.citation.spage67en_US
dc.citation.epage82en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber75en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00186-011-0375-0en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1432-5217


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