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dc.contributor.authorStrahan, P. E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTanyeri B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:47:08Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:47:08Z
dc.date.issued2015en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-1090
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21492
dc.description.abstractAfter Lehman's collapse in 2008, investors ran from risky money market funds. In 27 funds, outflows overwhelmed cash inflows, thus forcing asset sales. These funds sold their safest and most liquid holdings. Funds were thus left with riskier and longer maturity assets. Over the subsequent quarter, however, the hard-hit funds reduced risk more than other funds. In contrast, money funds hit by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks before Lehman did not alter portfolio risk. The result suggests that moral hazard concerns with the Treasury Guarantee of investor claims did not increase risk taking. Funds that benefited most from the government bailout reduced risk.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysisen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022109015000101en_US
dc.titleOnce burned, twice shy: money market fund responses to a systemic liquidity shocken_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.citation.spage119en_US
dc.citation.epage144en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber50en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1-2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0022109015000101en_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US


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