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dc.contributor.authorAshlagi, I.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoǧlu, E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKlaus, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:47:04Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:47:04Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21487
dc.description.abstractWe consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored. © 2012 .en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.004en_US
dc.titleA non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problemsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage228en_US
dc.citation.epage233en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber63en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.004en_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US


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