A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems

dc.contributor.author	Ashlagi, I.	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Karagözoǧlu, E.	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Klaus, B.	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2016-02-08T09:47:04Z
dc.date.available	2016-02-08T09:47:04Z
dc.date.issued	2012	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0165-4896
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11693/21487
dc.description.abstract	We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored. © 2012 .	en_US
dc.language.iso	English	en_US
dc.source.title	Mathematical Social Sciences	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.004	en_US
dc.title	A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US
dc.department	Department of Economics	en_US
dc.citation.spage	228	en_US
dc.citation.epage	233	en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber	63	en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber	3	en_US
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.004	en_US
dc.publisher	Elsevier BV	en_US