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dc.contributor.authorUnal, M.C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:46:55Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:46:55Z
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.identifier.issn1057610X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21480
dc.description.abstractThis study analyzes the impact of the Turkish Repentance Laws in undermining the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Did the repentance laws increase the PKK surrender, thereby decreasing the PKK violence? Vector Auto-Regression analysis indicates that enactment of repentance laws did not have any significant impact on PKK surrenders, failing to significantly decrease PKK violence. Yet it does not establish any meaningful relationship between the use of force and PKK surrenders. Descriptive analyses show the significant number of surrenders took place in 1993–94, 2001, and 2003, while the highest number of penitents submitted to the “Return to Home Law” in 2003. These values relate to a specific context. This study, however, asserts that surrendered and applicant PKK members were too few to influence the overall conflict, concluding that, in addition to what these laws mean to the penitents, the success/failure of repentance policies are related to the nature of Turkey's counterinsurgency and their respective context. © 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleStudies in Conflict and Terrorismen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1093889en_US
dc.titleOpening a Door for Return to Home: Impact and Effectiveness of Turkish Repentance Lawsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Political Science and Public Administrationen_US
dc.citation.spage128en_US
dc.citation.epage164en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber39en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/1057610X.2015.1093889en_US
dc.publisherTaylor and Francis Inc.en_US


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