Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorCaner, S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorÖzyıldırım, S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorUngan, A. E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:43:34Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:43:34Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.issn0920-8550
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21242
dc.description.abstractWe test for the existence of market discipline by shareholders of banks with a wide range of ownership structures. Discipline by shareholders manifests itself through monitoring banks' level of risk as well as through influencing banks' management actions. We find that shareholders utilize the relation between stock returns and different types of risk measures to monitor risky banks. Shareholders partially influence bank management by responding to decreasing stock returns with a demand to improve loan quality. Moreover, the influence on management in small banks is more pronounced compared to large banks.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Financial Services Researchen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10693-011-0118-7en_US
dc.subjectBank monitoringen_US
dc.subjectMarket disciplineen_US
dc.subjectShareholder influenceen_US
dc.subjectStock returnsen_US
dc.titleHow sensitive are bank managers to shareholder value?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculty of Business Administration
dc.citation.spage187en_US
dc.citation.epage205en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber42en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10693-011-0118-7en_US
dc.publisherSpringer New Yorken_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record