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dc.contributor.advisorKoray, Semih
dc.contributor.authorÖzgür, Onur
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-08T20:15:57Z
dc.date.available2016-01-08T20:15:57Z
dc.date.issued1998
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/18069
dc.descriptionAnkara : The Department of Economics and the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent Univ., 1998.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 1998.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references leaves 15-16.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this study, we introduce a different mechanism with a hybrid ownership definition lying in between public and private ownership. Agents have claims over the endowments and the total production of the economy instead of having absolute ownership rights. We define social desirability as the following: an alternative x is socially preferred to an alternative y if the majority of the agents prefer x to y. In this context, we investigate whether the competitive equilibrium outcome is socially the most desirable outcome and whether there are other efficient outcomes socially preferred to the competitive equilibrium outcome. We use a voting scheme where agents vote on the production alternatives of the economy. We investigate if there is a voting rule that leads to the competitive equilibrium outcome and what kind of a rule this latter is. The central finding of the study is that, for a class of production and utility functions, there is a voting rule that leads to the competitive equilibrium outcome. Moreover, this is a weighted voting rule where agents’ votes are their initial claims. A second important contribution is the analysis of the process of candidate nomination, which is most of the time, neglected by social choice problems. Finally, we consider the transfer problem where agents make transfers to other agents to make them vote on specific alternatives.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityÖzgür, Onuren_US
dc.format.extent16 leaves, tablesen_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectSocial choiceen_US
dc.subjectpolitical economyen_US
dc.subjectvoting behaviouren_US
dc.subjectinformationen_US
dc.subjectmodels of political processesen_US
dc.subject.lccHB846.8 .O94 1998en_US
dc.subject.lcshSocial choice--Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subject.lcshVoting--Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subject.lcshPolitical economy.en_US
dc.subject.lcshElections.en_US
dc.subject.lcshPublic goods.en_US
dc.titleConsistencyen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US


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