Buyback and target rebate contracts when the manufacturer operates under carbon cap and trade mechanism = Karbon ticareti mekanizması altında çalışan bir üretici ile geri alma ve hedef satış indirimi kontratların analizi
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Please cite this item using this persistent URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/17060
In this study, the coordination of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain is considered, in a single period environment where the manufacturer has carbon emission restriction with trade option. The customer demand over a period is assumed to be a random variable with an arbitrary distribution. Two types of contracts, namely the buyback and the target rebate contracts are considered. For each type, the contract parameters which achieve channel coordination have been studied. The models show that for both contract types, under specific parameter settings coordination is achievable. In particular, we show that under a buyback contract with a carbon trader manufacturer, coordination can be achieved, even if no returns are allowed, contrary to the findings of Pasternack, who first studied a buyback contract in a setting where carbon emissions are not taken into consideration. The results are illustrated by numerical examples.