The wars of Yugoslav dissolution and Britain's role in the making of international policy
Author(s)
Advisor
Ünal, HasanDate
1999Publisher
Bilkent University
Language
English
Type
ThesisItem Usage Stats
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Abstract
This study is a chronological examination of British politics and diplomacy
concerning the Former Yugoslavia from the explosion of war in 1991 right up to the
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. As such, it serves as a
case study of British diplomacy during that period. All in all, British policy towards
the Yugoslav dissolution wars was evaluated as unsuccessful both in terms of
achieving a stable peace in the region and containing the conflict. The major aim of
this study is to analyse the basic considerations and main motives behind the British
policy in dealing with the wars of Yugoslav dissolution. The study attempts to look at
the question whether or not any particular responsibility for the inadequate
international response to the Yugoslav crisis can be attributed to Britain. The study
argues that Britain’s Conservative government, rather than attempting to lead
international community to take more robust stance against Serbian genocidal war in
Bosnia and Hercegovina, used its diplomatic skills to subdue discussion of using
force whenever the issue arose and severely hampered a collective response to the
crisis. As a result, it is argued that Major government’s unwillingness to go beyond
humanitarian intervention, despite pressure from the US, from the media and public
and from two main opposition parties, reinforced its image of weakness and
incompetence and thus did have important political implications both at home and
abroad.