A game theoretic analysis of the strategic options available for Israel in response to Iran's nuclear program
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Please cite this item using this persistent URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/16876
Israel is the most concerned actor about Iran’s nuclear program due to its geographical position and fragile relations with Iran. Thus, Israel’s stance towards Iran’s nuclear program is particularly important in the nuclear crisis between Iran and the West. This thesis evaluates the four possible strategic options available for Israel in response to Iran’s nuclear program: controlling strategy, deterrence strategy, reassurance strategy, and combination of deterrence and reassurance strategies. Through a game theoretic approach, it is aimed to answer the questions thatwhat are the advantages and limitations of these strategies and which one would be the best option for Israel. Moreover, the underlying dynamics of each strategic option and their influence on the players’ choices are also presented through the extensive form game models. As a response to questions mentioned above, this thesis argues that instead of a pure deterrence, controlling, or reassurance strategy, combination of reassurance and deterrence strategies would promise better outcomes for Israel.