This thesis, through a game theoretic methodology, aims to build an accurate game theoretic model of the Second Punic War, and tries to analyze the military strategies and actions taken by the Carthaginian and Roman Republics. After observing that the modeling literature concerning the game theoretic studies of war has generally analyzed the wars beginning from the 19th century, this thesis also aims to provide a contribution to the game theoretic literature by constructing a model that displays the strategic interaction between Rome and Carthage. By starting from the question of how one could game theoretically model the Second Punic War and what argumentations would such a model would give, the work presented here compiles the available historical information regarding the military choices of the two Republics, and by using those literary findings, tries to explain the reasons behind Carthage’s offense and Rome’s defense choices. By arguing that the findings through game theoretic analysis is compatible with the historical literary evidence, iv the model also reveals novel argumentations concerning under what conditions both states would or would not prefer a particular military action.