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dc.contributor.authorWringe, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:04:24Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:04:24Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.issn0047-2786
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/13034
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I argue that a communicative theory of punishment of the sort advocated by Anthony Duff – cannot be extended to cover corporate bodies, such as corporations and nations. The problem does not arise from the fact that on the communicative view the point of punishment is to induce regret or remorse, and that corporate bodies cannot be the subject of such emotions. This problem can be solved. A more difficult problem arises when we ask why we should care that certain agents feel and feeland express remorse or regret. The sorts of answers to this question that the communicative theorist can appeal to when the punishment of individuals is in question do not have any obvious analogue on the collective level.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Social Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josp.12002en_US
dc.subjectRetributivismen_US
dc.subjectTheories Of punishmenten_US
dc.titleCollective agents and communicative theories of punishmenten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage436en_US
dc.citation.epage456en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber43en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/josp.12002en_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US


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