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dc.contributor.authorVinx, L.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:04:24Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:04:24Z
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.issn2045-3817
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/13033
dc.description.abstractAccording to Carl Schmitt, constitutional law and international law are analogous in that they are both forms of political law. Schmitt concludes that neither is open to legitimate judicial enforcement. This paper critically explores Schmitt’s analogy between constitutional and international law. It argues that the analogy can be turned against Schmitt and contemporary sceptics about international law: Since we no longer have any reason to deny the judicial enforceability of domestic constitutional law, the analogy now suggests that there is no reason to think that legitimate judicial enforcement of international law is impossible.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleGlobal Constitutionalismen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S2045381712000202en_US
dc.subjectCarl Schmitten_US
dc.subjectConstitutionalismen_US
dc.subjectInternational lawen_US
dc.subjectJudicialen_US
dc.subjectLegitimacyen_US
dc.titleCarl Schmitt and the analogy between constitutional and international law? are constitutional and international law inherently political?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage91en_US
dc.citation.epage124en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber2en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S2045381712000202en_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US


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