Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMichaelian, K. H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:04:24Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:04:24Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.issn1878-5158
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/13032
dc.description.abstractWhat entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleReview of Philosophy and Psychologyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0099-yen_US
dc.title(Social) metacognition and (self-)trusten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage481en_US
dc.citation.epage514en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber3en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s13164-012-0099-yen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record