(Social) metacognition and (self-)trust

Date
2012
Authors
Michaelian, K. H.
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Source Title
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Print ISSN
1878-5158
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Springer Verlag
Volume
3
Issue
4
Pages
481 - 514
Language
English
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Abstract

What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.

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