(Social) metacognition and (self-)trust
Author
Michaelian, K. H.
Date
2012Source Title
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Print ISSN
1878-5158
Publisher
Springer Verlag
Volume
3
Issue
4
Pages
481 - 514
Language
English
Type
ArticleItem Usage Stats
135
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138
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Abstract
What entitles you to rely on information received from others?
What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory?
Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor
others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the
intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental
to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a
significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.