Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
Journal of Economic Theory
Bochet, O., Ilkılıç, R., & Moulin, H. (2013). Egalitarianism under earmark constraints. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(2), 535-562.
Please cite this item using this persistent URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/12866
Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm. Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers. Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
- Department of Economics