The contents of perception and the contents of emotion
Author
Wringe, B.
Date
2015Source Title
Noûs
Print ISSN
0029-4624
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing
Volume
49
Issue
2
Pages
275 - 297
Language
English
Type
ArticleItem Usage Stats
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Abstract
Several philosophers think there are important analogies between emotions and
perceptual states. Furthermore, considerations about the rational assessibility of
emotions have led philosophers—in some cases, the very same philosophers—to
think that the content of emotions must be propositional content. If one finds it
plausible that perceptual states have propositional contents, then there is no obvious
tension between these views. However, this view of perception has recently been
attacked by philosophers who hold that the content of perception is object-like. I
shall argue for a view about the content of emotions and perceptual states which will
enable us to hold both that emotional content is analogous to perceptual content
and that both emotions and perceptual states can have propositional contents. This
will involve arguing for a pluralist view of perceptual content, on which perceptual
states can have both contents which are proposition-like and contents which are
object-like. I shall also address two significant objections to the claim that emotions
can have proposition-like contents. Meeting one of these objections will involve
taking on a further commitment: the pluralist account of perceptual content will
have to be one on which the contents of perception can be non-conceptual.