Complementarities and the Existence of Strong Berge Equilibrium

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Author
Keskin, K.
Saglam, C.
Date Issued
2014
Journal Title
RAIRO: Operations Research
Publisher
EDP Sciences
Language
English
Type
Research Paper
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Citation
Keskin, K., & Sağlam, H. Ç. (2014). Complementarities and the existence of strong Berge equilibrium. RAIRO-Operations Research, 48(3), 373-379.
Please cite this item using this persistent URL
http://hdl.handle.net/11693/12516
Abstract
This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities a la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.
Published as
http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2014012
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