Complementarities and the existence of Strong Berge equilibrium
Author
Keskin, K.
Sağlam, Ç.
Date
2014Source Title
RAIRO - Operations Research
Print ISSN
0399-0559
Publisher
EDP Sciences
Volume
48
Issue
3
Pages
373 - 379
Language
English
Type
ArticleItem Usage Stats
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Show full item recordAbstract
This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities a la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.
Keywords
Strong Berge equilibriumRefinement
Games with strategic complementarities
Fixed point theory
Supermodularity