Maskin-Monotonic Scoring Rules
Please cite this item using this persistent URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/12509
Social Choice and Welfare
Published ashttp://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/s00355-014-0835-6
- Department of Economics 
We characterize which scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic for each social choice problem as a function of the number of agents and the number of alternatives. We show that a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it satisfies a certain unanimity condition. Since scoring rules are neutral, Maskin-monotonicity turns out to be equivalent to Nash-implementability within the class of scoring rules. We propose a class of mechanisms such that each Nash-implementable scoring rule can be implemented via a mechanism in that class. Moreover, we investigate the class of generalized scoring rules and show that with a restriction on score vectors, our results for the standard case are still valid.
Dogan, B., & Koray, S. (2015). Maskin-monotonic scoring rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 44(2), 423-432.