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dc.contributor.authorKilinc, M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorNeyapti, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:00:46Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:00:46Z
dc.date.issued2012-03en_US
dc.identifier.issn0264-9993
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/12258
dc.description.abstractThis study provides a general equilibrium model to explore the welfare implications of bank regulation and supervision (RS). The model supports the basic expectations regarding the positive effects of RS on the growth rate, output, credit, investment, wages and profits; and its negative effects on the interest rate. In addition, RS is observed to lead to a convergence effect. Furthermore, it is observed that the decision of banks to monitor and charge differentiated interest rates to firms depends on the distribution of firm-specific moral hazard rates; bank monitoring increases profits as the distribution of producer type improves. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleEconomic Modellingen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2011.08.023en_US
dc.subjectBank regulation and supervisionen_US
dc.subjectGrowthen_US
dc.titleBank regulation and supervision and its welfare implicationsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage132en_US
dc.citation.epage141en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber29en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econmod.2011.08.023en_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1873-6122


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