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dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBag, P. K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T11:57:17Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T11:57:17Z
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/11262
dc.description.abstractWe consider a model of voluntary contributions for a public project with random number of potential contributors. The fundraiser, who observes this number, has to decide whether to reveal or suppress the information before contributions are given. The fundraiser’s objective is to collect maximal contributions. We show that whether the public project is convex or non-convex can be the key to the fundraiser’s announcement decision. In the convex case, this number is always revealed. In the non-convex case the number may not be revealed at all or sometimes revealed only when it is in an intermediate range. In the presence of multiple equilibria, total contributions increase with the extent of concealment.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Public Economicsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00106-2en_US
dc.subjectFundraisingen_US
dc.subjectPublic goodsen_US
dc.subjectFree-ridingen_US
dc.subjectInformation revelationen_US
dc.titleStrategic information revelation in fundraisingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage659en_US
dc.citation.epage679en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber87en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00106-2en_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US


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