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      • Department of Economics
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      Strategic information revelation in fundraising

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      Author(s)
      Bac, M.
      Bag, P. K.
      Date
      2003
      Source Title
      Journal of Public Economics
      Print ISSN
      0047-2727
      Publisher
      Elsevier BV
      Volume
      87
      Issue
      4
      Pages
      659 - 679
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
      Item Usage Stats
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      Abstract
      We consider a model of voluntary contributions for a public project with random number of potential contributors. The fundraiser, who observes this number, has to decide whether to reveal or suppress the information before contributions are given. The fundraiser’s objective is to collect maximal contributions. We show that whether the public project is convex or non-convex can be the key to the fundraiser’s announcement decision. In the convex case, this number is always revealed. In the non-convex case the number may not be revealed at all or sometimes revealed only when it is in an intermediate range. In the presence of multiple equilibria, total contributions increase with the extent of concealment.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
      Keywords
      Fundraising
      Public goods
      Free-riding
      Information revelation
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/11262
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00106-2
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