Strategic information revelation in fundraising
Date
2003Source Title
Journal of Public Economics
Print ISSN
0047-2727
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Volume
87
Issue
4
Pages
659 - 679
Language
English
Type
ArticleItem Usage Stats
142
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119
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Abstract
We consider a model of voluntary contributions for a public project with random number
of potential contributors. The fundraiser, who observes this number, has to decide whether
to reveal or suppress the information before contributions are given. The fundraiser’s
objective is to collect maximal contributions. We show that whether the public project is
convex or non-convex can be the key to the fundraiser’s announcement decision. In the
convex case, this number is always revealed. In the non-convex case the number may not be
revealed at all or sometimes revealed only when it is in an intermediate range. In the
presence of multiple equilibria, total contributions increase with the extent of concealment.
2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.