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      Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria

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      Author(s)
      Koray, Semih
      Sertel, M.
      Date
      2022-12
      Source Title
      Review of Economic Design
      Print ISSN
      1434-4742
      Publisher
      Springer
      Volume
      26
      Issue
      4
      Pages
      679 - 696
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
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      Abstract
      Delegation games are studied in the context of a symmetric linear Cournotic duopoly where redelegation is permissible. In the absence of extraneous delegation costs, the following results are demonstrated: (1)Each principal has an incentive to redelegate, increasing the length of his delegation chain.(2)As the length of the delegation chain grows beyond bound, (i)total output at the (Cournot) equilibrium on the industry floor converges in monotonically increasing fashion to the socially efficient one, and(ii)the maximand delegated by each primal delegator converges in monotonically decreasing fashion to the (true) profit function. As a consequence it is suggested that in a linear duopoly context socially efficient and truthful outcomes can be arbitrarily closely approximated by the use of Pretend-but-Perform Mechanisms of order sufficiently large. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
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      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/111502
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00323-5
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