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dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSaglam, I.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T11:56:46Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T11:56:46Z
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-7187
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/11066
dc.description.abstractJunior managers' learning decisions and career expectations, promotion criteria, and parent firms' growth strategies are interdependent. We study this interdependence in a two-stage game where a junior manager invests in unobservable industry-specific learning in response to the firm's growth strategy. In the absence of a credible promotion criterion the firm is unable to insure itself fully against defections, growth is low and ex-post regrettable managerial promotions may occur. Higher growth relaxes promotion decisions and erodes managers' learning incentives, whereas lower growth generates the opposite effect but increases the likelihood of defections. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleInternational Journal of Industrial Organizationen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00009-5en_US
dc.subjectSunk growthen_US
dc.subjectBayesian equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectAbility acquisitionen_US
dc.subjectPromotionsen_US
dc.titleManagerial defections, promotion criteria and firm growthen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage917en_US
dc.citation.epage940en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber17en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber7en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00009-5en_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US


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