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      Managerial defections, promotion criteria and firm growth

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      Author
      Bac, M.
      Saglam, I.
      Date
      1999
      Source Title
      International Journal of Industrial Organization
      Print ISSN
      0167-7187
      Publisher
      Elsevier BV
      Volume
      17
      Issue
      7
      Pages
      917 - 940
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
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      Abstract
      Junior managers' learning decisions and career expectations, promotion criteria, and parent firms' growth strategies are interdependent. We study this interdependence in a two-stage game where a junior manager invests in unobservable industry-specific learning in response to the firm's growth strategy. In the absence of a credible promotion criterion the firm is unable to insure itself fully against defections, growth is low and ex-post regrettable managerial promotions may occur. Higher growth relaxes promotion decisions and erodes managers' learning incentives, whereas lower growth generates the opposite effect but increases the likelihood of defections. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
      Keywords
      Sunk growth
      Bayesian equilibrium
      Ability acquisition
      Promotions
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/11066
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00009-5
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