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dc.contributor.authorMercenier, J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorYeldan, E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T11:56:45Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T11:56:45Z
dc.date.issued1997en_US
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/11063
dc.description.abstractTurkey has decided to harmonize its tarification structure with that of the European Union. For the country's authorities, this move to a Customs Union is only meant to be the first step toward integration in the European Union. There are signs, however, that political opposition to the government's procompetitive stance may be strong enough to block any further move toward fuller trade liberalization. We show, using applied intertemporal GE analysis, that to be welfare improving, the trade reform would have to be pursued further and nontariff barriers on European trade removed. Failure to do so could be more detrimental to domestic welfare than no reform at all. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleEuropean Economic Reviewen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00044-5en_US
dc.subjectDynamic applied general equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectImperfect competitionen_US
dc.subjectTurkeyen_US
dc.subjectCustoms unionen_US
dc.titleOn Turkey's trade policy: is a customs union with Europe enough?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of International Relationsen_US
dc.citation.spage871en_US
dc.citation.epage880en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber41en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3-5en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00044-5en_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1873-572X


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