There are multiple bargaining stages in a peace process and their outcomes can vary due to certain parameters affecting these processes. Studies examining peace processes highlighted various factors leading to failures in negotiated settlements as a peaceful resolution is conditional on many factors. In this thesis, I aimed to contribute to the existing literature by investigating the rebel organizational capabilities’ impact on the peaceful resolution of conflict by investigating prospects of negotiation failures. I conceptualized organizational capabilities as positive relations with constituencies, high centralization in leadership, territorial control, and natural resource funding and hypothesized that these capabilities are positively related to negotiation failures. To test these capabilities’ impact, I constructed a dataset by using available data which contains a total of 859 observations of 180 rebel groups in 63 different countries from the period 1990 to 2005. I used my dataset to run Cox proportional hazard regression models and logistic regression models. My findings from both analyses revealed mixed results in terms of constituency relations, organizational structure, and natural resource funding but confirmed that rebel organizations with territorial control are more likely to be involved in negotiation failures after a talk is initiated.