Browsing by Subject "Rationality"
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Item Open Access Anthony trollope on akrasia, self-deception, and ethical confusion(Indiana University, 2014) Fessenbecker, P.This essay takes as its point of departure Anthony Trollope’s tendency to reuse a version of the romantic triangle, one where a protagonist is committed to one character, becomes attracted to another, and hence delays fulfillment of the first relationship. This formal feature makes the philosophical problem of akrasia central, as the novels return repeatedly to agents who act against their own best judgment. Trollope’s novels reveal a complex array of irrationality, considering how our desires can lead to self-deception and how even judgment unbiased by desire may fail to move an agent. Perhaps most interestingly, Trollope challenges standard assumptions about rational behavior in depicting states of “ethical confusion,” where characters act irrationally precisely by acting on their best judgment. © 2014, Indiana University Press. All rights reserved.Item Open Access Arguing to defeat: eristic argumentation and irrationality in resolving moral concerns(Springer, 2020) Kurdoğlu, Rasim Serdar; Ateş, N. Y.By synthesizing the argumentation theory of new rhetoric with research on heuristics and motivated reasoning, we develop a conceptual view of argumentation based on reasoning motivations that sheds new light on the morality of decision-making. Accordingly, we propose that reasoning in eristic argumentation is motivated by psychological (e.g., anxiety reduction) or material (e.g., vested interests) gains that do not depend on resolving the problem in question truthfully. Contrary to heuristic argumentation, in which disputants genuinely argue to reach a practically rational solution, eristic argumentation aims to defeat the counterparty rather than seeking a reasonable solution. Eristic argumentation is susceptible to arbitrariness and power abuses; therefore, it is inappropriate for making moral judgments with the exception of judgments concerning moral taboos, which are closed to argumentation by their nature. Eristic argumentation is also problematic for strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making because it impedes the search for the right heuristic under uncertainty as an ecologically rational choice. However, our theoretical view emphasizes that under extreme uncertainty, where heuristic solutions are as fallible as any guesses, pretense reasoning by eristic argumentation may be instrumental for its adaptive benefts. Expanding the concept of eristic argumentation based on reasoning motivations opens a new path for studying the psychology of reasoning in connection to morality and decision-making under uncertainty. We discuss the implications of our theoretical view to relevant research streams, including ethical, strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making.Item Open Access Decision-making under extreme uncertainty: Eristic rather than heuristic(Emerald Publishing Limited, 2023-01-02) Kurdoğlu, Rasim Serdar; Ateş, Y. N.; Lerner, D. A.Purpose – This paper aims to introduce eristic decision-making in entrepreneurship. A decision is eristically made when it utilizes eristics, which are action-triggering short-cuts that draw on hedonic urges (e.g. sensationseeking). Unlike heuristics, eristic decision-making is not intendedly rational as eristics lead to decision-making without calculating or even considering the consequences of actions. Eristics are adaptive when uncertainty is extreme. Completely novel strategies, nascent venturing, corporate venturing for radical innovation and adapting to shocks (e.g. pandemic) are typically subject to extreme uncertainties. Design/methodology/approach – In light of the relevant debates in entrepreneurship, psychology and decision sciences, the paper builds new conceptual links to establish its theoretical claims through secondary research. Findings – The paper posits that people adapt to extreme uncertainty by using eristic reasoning rather than heuristic reasoning. Heuristic reasoning allows boundedly rational decision-makers to use qualitative cues to estimate the consequences of actions and to make reasoned decisions. By contrast, eristic reasoning ignores realistic calculations and considerations about the future consequences of actions and produces decisions guided by hedonic urges. Originality/value – Current entrepreneurial research on uncertainty usually focuses on moderate levels of uncertainty where heuristics and other intendedly rational decision-making approaches pay off. By contrast, this paper focuses on extreme uncertainty where eristics are adaptive. While not intendedly rational, the adaptiveness of eristic reasoning offers theoretically and psychologically grounded new explanations about action under extreme uncertainty.Item Open Access May ı treat a collective as a more means?(University of Illinois Press, 2014) Wringe, B.According to Kant, it is impermissible to treat humanity as a mere means. If we accept Kant's equation of humanity with rational agency, and are literalists about ascriptions of agency to collectives it appears to follow that we may not treat collectives as mere means. On most standard accounts of what it is to treat something as a means this conclusion seems highly implausible. I conclude that we are faced with a range of options. One would be to rethink the equation of humanity with rationality. Another would be to abandon the prohibition on treating as a means. The last would be to abandon literalist construals of attribution of agency to collectives