Rethinking State Failure: The Political Economy of Security*

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Analysis of the relationship between globalisation and security remains relatively untouched in the literature, notwithstanding the increasing interest in the impact of globalisation on security since the September 11, 2001 attacks. In the 1990s, as the literature on globalisation rapidly grew,[1] the relationship between globalisation and security had received scant attention.[2] Although this has begun to change in light of the September 11, 2001 events—which have led to a surge of interest in this relationship[3]—the continuing prevalence of the existing state-based and military-focused frameworks has so far not enabled the development of a full understanding of the impact of globalisation on security. This is evident in the way policymakers and scholars alike have represented 'state failure' as the greatest threat to global security due to the supposed harbouring of terrorists in conditions already rendered fragile by the impact of neoliberal globalisation.[4] According to this view,

> "failing and failed states present a danger to international stability as well as to the well-being of their populations. Internationally, they can become safe havens for terrorist organisations, centres for the trade of drugs and arms, and breeding grounds for dangerous diseases" (Ottaway/Meir 2004).

As will be argued below, such an approach to 'state failure' is problematic in at least three respects. First, it focuses on the supposed symptoms of 'state failure' (global terrorism) rather than the structural conditions that permit such failure to occur. This itself results from an unreflective attitude to both scholarship and policymaking. Second, it betrays an 'externalist' conception of globalisation in the sense that globalisation is regarded as an 'out there' phenomenon, whereas it is very much an 'in here' occurrence that constitutes and is constituted by the transformation of the state. Yet, as will be argued below, the remedy to this problem cannot be found in presenting an 'internalist' account of 'state failure' as characteristic of mainstream International Relations (IR) literature. Third, the existing approach is also reductionist in that it reduces the security dimension of globalisation to the threat posed by terrorism to state security; for example by seeking to understand the globalisation of security through locating terrorist organisations within 'failed states'; thereby failing to move

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1 See, for example, Rosenau 1996; Clark 1997; Wallerstein 2000; or Keohane/Nye 2000.

2 Exceptions to this generalisation could include Booth 1998; Clark 1999: 107-126; Barkawi/Laffey 1999 or Barkawi 2005.

3 See, inter alia, Tuchman Mathews 2002; Campbell 2002 or LeFeber 2002.

4 See, for example, The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002; Crocker 2002; Rotberg 2004.

away from the state-centrism that has characterised mainstream IR literature. By contrast, this argument moves towards laying out the contours of an alternative framework to state 'failure' that is attentive to the conditions of and the agency behind the uneven development of accumulation patterns and the importation of 'Western' models of sovereign territoriality in 'non-Western' locales. This alternative framework, it is argued, might assist in moving beyond the prevalent approach to 'failed states' within policy-making and academic thought. After all, as Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause remind us, 'what has collapsed is more the *vision* (or dream) of the progressive developmental state that sustained generations of academics, activists and policymakers, than any real existing state'. Hence the authors' call to analyse state failure more historically as part of a 'broader and more prevalent crisis in the capacities and legitimacy of modern states.' (Miliken/Krause 2002: 755).

1. Internationalisation, Globalisation, the State and Security

Globalisation means different things to different people. As a process, it has developed as an extension of neoliberal economic policy-making. Viewed as such, it is not a process without agency. On the contrary, it has been shaped by the processes of the internationalisation of the state and production set in motion during the post-World War II era. On this Robert Cox writes:

> "Such procedures began with the mutual criticism of reconstruction plans in western European countries (the US condition for Marshall aid funds), continued with the development of annual review procedures in NATO (which dealt with defence and defence support programmes), and became an acquired habit of mutual consultation and mutual review of national policies (through the OECD and other agencies)" (Cox 1981: 145).

Since the erosion of *pax Americana* principles of world order in the 1970s, there has been an increasing internationalisation of production and finance driven, at the apex of an emerging global class structure, by a 'transnational managerial class' (Cox 1981: 147). Taking advantage of the conditions of uneven development, there has been an integration of production processes on a transnational scale with Transnational Corporations (TNCs) promoting the operation of different elements of a single process in different territorial locations. It is this organisation of production and finance on a transnational level that fundamentally distinguishes neoliberal globalisation from the period of *pax Americana.* The *transnational* restructuring of capitalism in globalisation is thus realised in this definition, which acknowledges the emergence of new social forces of capital and labour (Bieler et al. 2006). Besides the transnational managerial class, other elements of productive capital (involved in manufacturing and extraction), including small and medium-sized businesses acting as contractors and suppliers, and import-export businesses, as well elements of financial capital (involved in banking insurance and finance) have been supportive of this transnationalisation of production. Hence there has been a rise in the structural power of transnational capital promoted by forms of

elite interaction that have forged common perspectives, or an 'emulative uniformity', between business, state officials, and representatives of international organisations favouring the logic of capitalist market relations.[5] In security terms this means that

> "Part of the globalist agenda is to push NATO into a large-scale modernisation programme so that its forces can share military responsibilities with the US and maintain similar operational capabilities. It is a strategy that incorporates NATO expansion into eastern Europe, and US military corporations are anxious to be part of this build-up by developing 'transatlantic industrial alliances'" (Harris 2002: 19).

Since the period in the rise of such transnational capital in the 1970s, the social bases across many forms of state have altered in relation to the above logic of capitalist market relations. Whilst some have championed such changes as the 'retreat of the state' (Strange 1996), or the emergence of a 'borderless world' (Ohmae 1990, 1996), and others have decried the global proportions of such changes in production (Hirst/Thompson 1999, Weiss 1998), it is argued here that the transnationalisation of production has profoundly transformed—but not eroded—the role of the state. The internationalisation of the state (meaning the way transnational processes of consensus formation, underpinned by the internationalisation of production and the thrust of globalisation) has been transmitted through the policy-making channels of governments, with direct consequences for security issues. The network of control that has maintained the structural power of capital has been supported by an 'axis of influence', consisting of institutions such as the World Bank, which have ensured the ideological osmosis and dissemination of policies in favour of the perceived exigencies of the global political economy. Across different forms of state in countries of advanced and peripheral capitalism, the state has become restructured through a neoliberal logic of capitalist competition from the 1970s to the present (Cox 1992: 31).

This approach to globalisation is significant because it does not take 'states' and 'markets' as ahistorical starting points of analysis, whereas mainstream approaches to globalisation within IR generally concentrate on whether global structural change implies the loss of state authority to the market or whether some form of control can be maintained. David Held and Anthony McGrew go beyond this dichotomy in that they argue that the state has neither remained unchanged nor lost authority but has become transformed and thus its powers, functions and authority have been re-constituted (Held/ McGrew 2002: 126). The different stress by the two authors, nevertheless, results in similar outcomes. The state is still perceived to be in an *exterior*, or external, relationship with the market, controlling it separately from the outside, even to the extent that the sphere of civil society is exalted as an intervening realm of autonomous action. Jan Art Scholte speaks about public management of private market forces, where "state, substate and suprastate laws and institutions take firm hold of the steering wheel and harness the forces of globalisation to explicit and democratically determined public policies" (Scholte 2000: 291). Yet "the autonomy and democratic qualities of associational life are partly belied by the historical association of civil society with the liberal state and capitalism" (Pasha/Blaney

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5 Cox 1987: 298; Gill/ Law 1989: 484; Gill 1995: 400-401

1998: 420). Put more explicitly, state and market only appear as separate entities due to the way production is organised around private property relations in capitalism (Wood 1995: 31-36). By neglecting the central importance of the sphere of production, 'global governance' approaches embodied in the work of Held or Scholte overlook the historical specificities of capitalism and the vital internal links between state and market, with the former securing private property within civil society to ensure the functioning of the latter. After all, as Tarak Barkawi writes, "states are not victims of economic globalisation so much as they are *agents* of it. Contemporary economic globalisation is in part the result of the uses of state power to pursue the political project of a global free market" (Barkawi 2005: 10). Hence the relationship between the globalisation of the world economy and the emerging condition of 'globalised security'. As will be argued below, insight into this relationship—and the agency of the state in its formation—is found to be lacking in existing approaches to IR in general and security in particular in so far as they confuse internationalisation with globalisation. The two are not the same thing. This point begs further clarification.

The trend towards internationalisation of security (understood as increasing recourse to collective security and multilateral efforts, as with the foundation and later expansion of NATO) has been recognised in the field of strategy for some time. Indeed, throughout history, states have attempted to address issues raised by the need to project force in faraway lands and to defend against enemies with imperial ambitions through forming alliances, security regimes, collective security organisations and security communities. The globalisation of security is different from the internationalisation of security in that the former involves the latter but goes beyond being an inter-state phenomenon. In the case of internationalisation, states can opt for, or opt out of, multilateral security arrangements without experiencing a fundamental change in their political authority. Globalisation, on the other hand, involves the simultaneous transformation of the state and its security environment (Leander 2004).

The process of globalisation has complicated the security predicament of states in at least four respects. First, in a non-globalised world, states assumed the twin roles of guaranteeing their members' security and posing the main threat to the security of other states. This has changed with the impact of globalisation; the threat is no longer merely another state, but mostly the internal weakening of states (Guéhenno 1988/9: 5-19). As witnessed in the September 11, 2001 attacks, internal weakening of some states can become a security concern for others. In this case, 'non-state' actors that remained unchecked within the boundaries of Afghanistan acquired the ability to project force across boundaries, thereby exporting their own problems to the United States. What is more, not only the developing but also developed states have begun to experience this weakening in recent years. Whereas states have been growing stronger in a number of respects (in an attempt to supervise the global political economy), they have been weakened in some other respects. Spheres of state activity such as security, which were previously dominated by governmental actors, are now increasingly being shaped by 'non-governmental' actors (Sørensen 2004).

Second, politics is being displaced as an increasing number of issues are located beyond the control of governments (Leander 2004). Issues such as global warming, depletion of global resources, gendered violence and human cloning cross boundaries and place themselves onto the agendas of states. This has created pressures for governments to address a broader range of security concerns. However, not all states have the capacity to meet such a broad security agenda (which includes environmental, economic, societal and political as well as military threats). This is more of a problem for developing states that already suffer from a limited capacity in handling their 'internal' affairs while seeking to minimize 'external' interference.

Third, states now have to cope with an increasing number of 'non-state' actors who have become more active and influential due to the opportunities created by the process of neoliberal globalisation. What has happened with the impact of neoliberal globalisation is that areas of decision-making such as national security, which previously did not avail themselves to public scrutiny, are now politicised by way of being exposed to public scepticism and debate. That is to say, the transformative effects of neoliberal globalisation have created extra strain for the already fragile state structures in the developing world by limiting their freedom of action, subordinating them to larger bodies and eroding their distinctive identity (Grugel 2005: 204). Many developing states are therefore faced with the dilemma of choosing between openness to the international states system and neoliberal globalisation (which runs the risk of becoming vulnerable to threats against regime security) or closing off debates on issues they consider 'sensitive' (at the risk of endangering democratisation and sustainable development efforts).

Fourth, states have to operate in an environment where the privileges they once enjoyed are further restricted by international norms. Traditional approaches to security have yet to account for the dynamics that create pressures for states to transform if they are to cope with the impact neoliberal globalisation has had on security. This is true not only for the developing but also for the developed states of the world. The globalisation of the world economy has made it difficult for governments to provide basic security to their citizens not only in remote parts of Africa but also in North America. The United States government, during the George W. Bush administration, has increasingly found it difficult to cope with some aspects of the neoliberal global political economy — which it has championed in the post-Cold War era — as it began to tarnish US people's confidence in the government. The Bush Administration responded by representing economic globalisation in security language (Higott 2004).

Yet, this predicament of the state in the security sphere should not distract our attention from the ways in which state power has been used to further the processes of internationalisation and globalisation. Barkawi's work is illuminating in this sense in that he points to how, through waging war, states have contributed to the process of neoliberal globalisation. From this perspective, the US-led 'War on Terror', emerges not as a description of "the state we're in" but as "the governing influence in world politics," shaping events "in many distinct locales, even as it is shaped by them" (Barkawi 2005: 171). Viewed as

such, representations of the issue of 'state failure' as *the* threat against international security constitutes not so much a diagnosis of a 'threat' but a technique of governance on the part of some actors that seek to sustain the workings of neoliberal economic order. Yet, the prevalence of existing frameworks has so far not allowed us to appreciate such dynamics. Accordingly, 'state failure' has increasingly been represented as the greatest threat to global security without paying due attention to the broader context within which some states 'succeed' while others 'fail'. In what follows, the article will turn to look at approaches to globalisation and security within pre- and post-September 11 literature to point to how our understanding of 'globalised security' in general and 'state failure' in particular has become impoverished.

2. Approaches to Globalisation and Security 'before' September 11, 2001

Before September 11, 2001 the security dimension of this transformation was left relatively unexplored. This could be explained with reference to an 'optimism' that, at the time, was shared by scholars and policy-makers alike. The so-called 'hyperglobalisers' expected the world to become a more 'secure' place as a side-effect of further globalisation (Gantzke/Li 2003). Their thinking was that globalisation would induce states to solve their conflicts via non-military means not only because they would achieve common ways of thinking but also because a breakdown in business relations would simply be regarded as too costly (Friedmann 1999; Barber 1995). Thomas Friedman, one of the early upholders of this view, maintained that even those who were further impoverished as a consequence of the side-effects of the globalisation of the world economy were not against globalisation; for they wanted to go to 'Disneyworld, not to the barricades'. Without neglecting how globalisation also creates opportunities for terrorists who threaten global security, Friedman nevertheless maintained that further democratisation of the process of globalisation would eventually help to remedy the problems that it causes (Friedmann 1999).

Contrasting with the 'optimism' that characterised the literature, many so-called 'sceptics' begged to differ. They pointed to the destructive impact resulting from the global integration of production and finance on the peripheries of the world and highlighted the processes of 'structural violence' perpetuated by global forces (Thomas/Wilkin 1997). The hyperglobalisers, they noted, failed to acknowledge such processes as long as these did not disrupt the course of further neoliberal globalisation and market integration. Even one of the chief proponents of the liberal tradition, Michael Doyle, exposed how the process of neoliberal globalisation further exacerbated global inequalities and injustices and pointed to its likely repercussions for global security (Doyle 2000). According to Doyle, "globalisation both sustains elements of the Kantian peace and also undermines it, making it less sustainable and indeed vitiating some of the democracy on which it is founded" (Doyle 2000: 82). Recognising such

effects of globalisation, however, would have required the adoption of a reflexive approach that is cognisant of the effects of one's thinking and acting on world politics (Rasmussen 2002).

It is worth emphasising here that during this period, optimists and pessimists alike shared a 'narrow' understanding of 'security' as the prevention and/or limiting of inter-state war. Other, more structural kinds of insecurities that are not addressed (if not caused) by states did not make it into prevalent definitions of security. What is more, the hyper-globalisers, who declared the retreat of the state in economic affairs, believed in its continuing centrality so far as the security sphere was concerned. This was evident in their definition of security as the absence of 'direct' violence caused mostly by the threat and use of military force, to the neglect of the more 'structural' kinds of violence that also take economic-political-cultural and social forms (Galtung 1969). Accordingly, they failed to see how the process of neo-liberal globalisation further exacerbated the insecurities faced by myriad actors — both individual and collective social groups — in different parts of the world.

If the optimism of the hyper-globalisers was one of the reasons why the security dimension of globalisation was left relatively untouched in the literature in the pre-September 11, 2001 period, another reason had to do with the academic field of security studies which failed to consider fully the potential impact of globalisation on security. None of the lively debates on security that took place during the 1990s was directly about neoliberal globalisation and its impact on security. During this period, scholars in the United States debated the virtues of 'defensive' versus 'offensive' realism (Mearsheimer 1990; Frankel 1996), whereas those who adopted constructivist approaches researched 'security culture'.[6] Scholars in Britain, Canada and continental Europe, on the other hand, contributed to the development of Critical Security Studies, which made use of the theoretical tools provided by critical theories to re-think security.[7] Yet, notwithstanding such significant contributions to re-thinking security on both sides of the Atlantic, very few scholars focused on neoliberal globalisation as a context that gave rise to the need for re-thinking. On the contrary, these new approaches to re-thinking security were mostly seen as having been encouraged by the end of the Cold War (Tuchman Matthews 1990). The process of neoliberal globalisation, which could be considered to have created the conditions that allowed for the end of the Cold War, on the other hand, was left relatively unexplored. Another development that cannot solely be explained with reference to the end of the Cold War was the variation of threats in terms of both their sources and their targets. What was left untouched was how some of those developments — which are usually considered to have been caused by the end of the Cold War (such as the broadening of security, or the emergence of the politics of identity as a source of conflict)—were also the consequences of neoliberal globalisation.[8]

6 For examples of constructivism in security studies, see, *inter alia*, McSweeney 1999 or Weldes et al. 1999.

7 Representative here would be Booth, 1991; Krause/Williams 1998; Wyn Jones 1999; Bilgin 2004.

8 This is proposed by Clark 1999: 113-114 and critically dealt with by Morton 2004.

During this period, the authors of the relatively few works on globalisation and security focused upon the issue of the impact of globalisation on 'national security', i.e. state security. It was argued that the effects of the process of globalisation on security and strategy were minimal given the centrality of states and the military instrument in shaping inter-state relations in this field. Maintaining that globalisation did not call for a questioning of established ways of approaching security issues, they argued that existing institutions and actors should be expected to adapt to the globalisation of the world economy and assume new roles in the shaping of security relations. This is because the process of neoliberal globalisation has not changed the central dynamics of world politics; in the absence of a world government to provide for citizens' security, states will continue to exist and provide for this need. According to a key realist author, Kenneth N. Waltz, the increasing economic interdependence and integration among states has not decreased but made more central the roles played by states in world politics. This is because international politics is shaped not by economic relations but by power differences among states. What is more, this situation should not be expected to change so long as governments and citizens continue to forego their welfare and even security to meet perceived threats against their identity (such as religion and ethnicity). In Waltz's words, "politics, as usual, prevails upon economics" (Waltz 1999).

Not all studies produced during this period played down the impact of neoliberal globalisation on security. Yet, those works that focused upon the relationship between globalisation and security invariably represented globalisation as a process that developed outside states and constituted threats to their 'national security' (Flanagan et al. 2001). Although the authors of this study adopted a broadened definition of security appreciative of its non-military dimensions, they invariably analysed this broad agenda from the perspective of states without paying due attention to the social forces underpinning the global dimensions of (in)security.

To sum up, during the 1990s, not enough attention was paid to the impact of globalisation on security. The reasons for this include the 'optimism' of hyper-globalisers as well as security studies experts' underestimation of the significance of neoliberal globalisation for security. This was because the latter channelled their energy into proving the hyper-globalisers wrong about 'the retreat of the state' by pointing to the continuing centrality of the state in the security sphere. While doing that, they failed to inquire into the factors that seemed to sustain the centrality of the state's role in this sphere. They also failed to look into the issue of the impact of neoliberal globalisation on security and the erosion of the state's capacity in the production of 'national security', which is due to competing claims against the states' monopoly over the means of coercion, and the increase in the range of threats faced by states through the overburdening of state security agendas resulting from broadened security concerns. In those relatively few studies that focused upon the security dimension, globalisation was represented as a process that is 'external' to the state and that constitutes a threat to its 'national security'. As a consequence of this tendency, the role played by the state in the process of neoliberal globalisation is neglected to a great

extent. Another consequence of such neglect is that the security dimension of neoliberal globalisation is left under-researched. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that this has caused an impoverishment of the literature on both globalisation and security.

3. Approaches to Globalisation and Security 'after' September 11, 2001

The September 11 attacks in 2001 against New York and Washington, D.C. have caused an upsurge of interest in the impact of globalisation on security. So much so that in the few years that followed the events, other dimensions of globalisation were momentarily left aside to analyse the security dimension (Green/Griffith 2002). This was caused partly by Western leaders' representation of the events within the framework of globalisation. Paul Wolfowitz, who was US Assistant Secretary of Defence at the time, chose to explain the events in the following terms.

> "Along with the globalisation that is creating interdependence among the world's free economies, there is a parallel globalisation of terror, in which rogue states and terrorist organisations share information, intelligence, technology, weapons materials and know-how."[9]

In 2002, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* also pointed to globalisation as the context which allowed for terrorists to reach anywhere around the world, announcing that 'America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones' with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) similarly producing a 'Fragile States Strategy' focusing on the problems of governance and civil conflict arising from poor state capacity and effectiveness (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, United States Agency for International Development 2005). It was announced in the most recent National Security Strategy (2006) document that 'the United States recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies' leading to the establishment of a new Office for Reconstruction and Stabilisation and increased likelihood of military-to-military co-operation between the US and African states (The National Security Strategy 2006; The Guardian 2/13/2005). Those studies that were produced in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 were inevitably shaped by this discourse and its equation of the globalisation of security with terrorism and a focus invariably on the threat posed by globalisation to the national security of states (Anderson 2004). Indicative here is also the recently-launched UK Commission for Africa report, *Our Common Interest*, that has at its centre

> "the long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states . . . to build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions" (Commission for Africa Report 2005).

As Tony Blair indicated, in launching the Commission for Africa report, "to tackle the instability, conflict, and despair which disfigures too much of Africa and which can fuel extremism

9 Cited in Rasmussen 2002: 330.

and violence, is to help build *our* own long-term peace and prosperity" (Blair 2005). Yet the issue of how to interpret such events in alternative ways within different conceptual frameworks has been raised very infrequently.[10] Likewise, the calls for a total rethinking of security relations or the adoption of new security policies worldwide have been quickly dismissed.[11]

Although policy-makers' pointing the finger at globalisation as the culprit behind the September 11 attacks has helped to generate more intensive questioning of its security dimension, many of the studies produced in the past few years have indicated that traditional approaches continue to prevail and shape interpretations of security dynamics. Two characteristics are shared by most if not all of these studies. First, they are 'externalist' in that they have portrayed globalisation as a process 'external' to the state. Second, they are reductionist in that they have identified 'international terrorism' as the major threat to security and have busied themselves with looking for strategies to cope with this threat, both inside and outside national boundaries (see, for example Satanovskii 2001). In what follows, each of these two characteristics will be viewed in turn. Before this, though, a word of caution is in order. Criticising the post-September 11, 2001 literature for its almost exclusive focus on terrorism should not be taken as underestimating the threat terrorism poses to individual, national and global security. What is being criticised here is the externalist and reductionist character of the traditional approaches, which prevent a fuller understanding of the current dynamics.

The traditional approaches are 'externalist' because they look at globalisation as a transformation that is taking place in the external environment without realising how the state is also being transformed at the same time. As Ripsman and Paul have characteristically emphasised,

> "very weak or failed states such as those in sub-Saharan Africa have had their fragile national security establishments buffeted by the pressures of globalisation, adding further impetus for state collapse" (Ripsman/Paul 2005: 200-2001).

Yet, these authors fail to see the role played by the state in this process. As Georg Sørensen has pointed out, both those who maintain the 'retreat of the state' and those who underline its continuing centrality fail to understand the character of the transformation of the state. This is because their understanding of this relationship is that of a 'zero-sum game' of only winning or only losing (Sørensen 2005: 6-7). This is perhaps most starkly supported in the scholarly community by Robert Kaplan's vision of the 'coming anarchy' in West Africa that is regarded as a predicament that will soon confront the rest of the world.

> "The coming upheaval, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering" (Kaplan 2000: 9).

Hence a presumed reversion "to the Africa of the Victorian atlas. It consists now of a series of coastal trading posts . . . and an interior that, owing to violence, and disease, is again becoming... 'blank' and 'unexplored'" (Kaplan 2000: 18). Similarly, Samuel Huntington has referred to "a global breakdown of law and order, failed

10 A signal exception in this regard is Cammack 2006.

11 See, for example, Booth/Dunne 2002: 1-23; Tickner 2002; or Agathangelou/Ling 2004.

states, and increasing anarchy in many parts of the world" yielding to a 'global Dark Ages' about to descend on humanity. The threat here is characterised as a resurgence of non-Western power generating conflictual civilisational fault-lines. For Huntington's supposition is that "the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc... from the bulge of Africa to central Asia... has bloody borders and bloody innards" (Huntington 1997: 285, 321; 1993: 35). In the similar opinion of Francis Fukuyama,

> "Weak or failing states commit human rights abuses, provoke humanitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigration, and attack their neighbours. Since September 11, it also has been clear that they shelter international terrorists who can do significant damage to the United States and other developed countries" (Fukuyama 2004: 125).

Finally, the prevalence of warlords, disorder, and anomic behaviour is regarded by Robert Rotberg as the primary causal factor behind the proliferation of 'failed states'. The leadership faults of figures such as Siakka Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaïre), Siad Barre (Somalia), or Charles Taylor (Liberia) are therefore condemned. Analyses, in the case of these states, rely on an 'internalist' as opposed to an 'externalist' account pointing to the 'process of decay', of 'shadowy insurgents', of states that exist merely as 'black holes', of 'dark energy' and 'forces of entropy' (Rotberg 2004: 9-10). Neither of the two alternative accounts is able to capture the relationship between the 'internal' and the 'external' that allows some states to 'fail' while others 'succeed'.

Likewise, the security sphere is currently characterised by "as much ... state performance as of non-performance" (Clark 1999: 107). In the eras that preceded the globalisation of security, "political communities both guaranteed their members' security and posed the main threat to the security of other communities" (Guéhenno: 1988/9: 9). This began to change as part and parcel of the process of neoliberal globalisation. This is because "the threat is no longer another competing community, but rather the internal weakening of communities" (Guéhenno 1988/9: 10). What this means is that the 'insecurity dilemma' has become a fact of life for not only developing but also developed states of this world. The term 'insecurity dilemma' was put forward by Brian Job to point to the increasing inadequacy of the 'security dilemma' when accounting for the predicament of developing states whose major insecurities stem from 'inside' the boundaries whereas the realm 'outside' is relatively secure thanks to the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, which are the building blocks of international society (Moon 1995; Hey 1995). What the process of neoliberal globalisation seems to have also brought about is the condition that both developed as well as developing states of the world now have to face insecurities stemming from 'inside' and 'outside' their boundaries. In other words, the 'security dilemma' may no longer be adequate in accounting for the insecurities of the developed world either, if it ever was a suitable metaphor in the first place.

When globalisation is understood as the blurring of the line that distinguishes 'inside' from 'outside', the need to analyse the state along with its structural environment becomes clear. What distinguishes neoliberal globalisation from the other transformations in world history is the way in which it alters both the state together with its environment. What is understood by the transformation of the 'inside' is the 'displacement of politics' in an environment beset by the blurring of the divide between 'do-

mestic' and 'foreign affairs'. Yet it is not enough to assume that states attempt to legitimize their actions simply within their own boundaries. This is because today's neoliberal globalisation is:

> "characterised by the weakening of existing institutions, public and private, and the direct confrontation of individuals with global forces . . . This evolution calls into question the role of political institutions: their power and relevance seem to recede, at the very moment when they are expected to meet the increased demand for identity" (Guéhenno: 1988/9: 9).

However, the literature mostly equates globalisation with internationalisation and/or multilateralism. For instance, as Jan Aart Scholte has noted, the journal *Foreign Policy* (which is translated into many of the world's languages) looks at state-to-state relations (foreign investment, foreign travel, membership to international institutions and organisations, international phone traffic) when preparing its globalisation index which is used to measure which state is globalised and to what extent (Scholte 2000: 19). Equating globalisation with internationalisation, this perspective fails to see the transformation the state is going through. Likewise, studies on the security dimension of globalisation equate globalisation with states' increasing resort to multilateral efforts in security maintenance. Needless to say, the two are not the same thing.

Even those studies that professedly focus on the transformation of security in a globalising world often fail to recognize what it entails. As noted above, this arguably is due to the continuing prominence of mainstream approaches within IR. Notwithstanding the recent proliferation of works seeking to understand globalisation's impact on security, debates have so far tended to focus on 'globalisation and national security' to the neglect of 'globalised security'. The difference between the two is no mere semantic juggling; it is central to how we understand the world that we live in. Indeed, these two terms stand for two distinct approaches to understanding the relationship between globalisation and security. Those who think about this relationship in former terms ('globalisation and national security') understand globalisation as a transformation that is taking place merely in the environment that is 'outside' the state boundaries, causing a proliferation of threats and thereby adversely affecting the 'national security' of states. Those who think about the relationship between globalisation and security in terms of 'globalised security', on the other hand, point to how the 'inside' is being transformed in tandem with the 'outside'. Viewed as such, globalisation of security involves the transformation of the state as well as the environment in which it is set. This, in turn, requires viewing neoliberal globalisation not merely as an 'out there' but also as an 'in here' phenomenon.

The traditional approach to security is not only externalist but also reductionist in that it equates the security dimension of globalisation to the terrorist threat. This approach is also statist by virtue of its privileging of state security over human, societal and global security. Denying its statism, it presents itself as merely state-centric.[12] The primacy accorded to 'national security' is explained with reference to the central role states play in the production of security. Accordingly, it fails to move away from the more traditional approaches to IR that have neglected studying the state while adhering it a central role in

12 On the difference between the two perspectives, see Bilgin 2002.

world politics. The only significant change in the traditional framework remains that of placing non-state actors alongside states. Needless to say, both groups of actors continue to be viewed as billiard balls. It is because of the continuing primacy of this traditionalist approach that many scholars continue to view globalisation as a process that is 'external' to the state and as causing an environment within which it is easier for the harbouring of terrorists, thereby failing to see how the 'inside' is being transformed along with the 'outside'. This is no more evident than the post-September 11, 2001 focus on 'failed states' as the major threat against US national security (Washington Quarterly Special Issue (2002); National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, 2006). This indeed is a prime example of how attempts to understand a phenomenon such as terrorism have developed within the straitjacket imposed by the traditional 'national security' framework, as the next section outlines in more detail.

4. The Traditional Approach to Security in a Globalising World

Philip Zelikow's article entitled 'The Transformation of National Security' could be viewed as an example of this problem (Zelikow 2003). Zelikow prefaces his analysis by pointing to how "the division of security policy into domestic and foreign components is breaking down" (Zelikow 2003: 20). Yet the author clearly considers this diagnosis to be of relevance in some but clearly not all parts of the world. This becomes clear in the remainder of the article, where Zelikow puts forward the policy recommendation that the United States, from now onwards, "must delve into societies, into problems from law enforcement to medical care, in novel ways—challenging international institutions and the principles that define them to adapt" (Zelikow 2003: 20). This, in turn, could be considered as an indication of an unreflective attitude to scholarly analysis in that the author fails to note how, throughout the Cold War, the United States did "delve into societies" through resort to military as well as non-military means (Kolko 2002). What the author also seems to miss is that the blurring of the internal/external divide is not new within the developing world context. It has just become more acute due to the process of globalisation. Lastly, the author fails to note how this divide is also blurred in the developed world. For Zelikow, it is the world 'out there' that is changing, thereby constituting 'new' threats to US national security. Characteristic of his externalist approach to security, Zelikow maintains that what the US should do is to adapt to this new 'external' environment; reminiscent of arguments outlined earlier about the 'coming anarchy' of security concerns soon to flood the West. The author's analysis also smacks of reductionism in that he understands the problem of security in a globalising world as the threat international terrorism poses to the national security of developed states such as the United States.

The line dividing the developed and developing world is also blurring in a way that Zelikow fails to notice. The United States constitutes a good

case for studying how this works. The neoliberal global political economy has brought about an increase in economic insecurities of US citizens. With the government finding it difficult to fully meet such insecurities, US citizens have begun to question the state's ability to fulfil its duty of maintaining security (Lipschutz 1995). The US government, increasingly under the George W. Bush administration, has come to 'securitise' economic policy in an attempt to cope with the economic insecurities brought about by the neoliberal global political economy. Indeed, "economic globalisation … is now seen not simply in neoliberal economic terms, but also through the lenses of the national security agenda of the United States. Economic globalisation is seen not only as a benefit, but also as a 'security problem'" (Higott 2004). It should be noted that such securitisation has occurred not merely out of concern for citizens' well-being but also in an attempt to "[re-boost] the US economy at the expense of the others." In that sense, the US government's actions could be viewed as "more nationalist than neo-liberal in its attitudes towards the drivers of economic globalisation and institutions of global and economic governance" (Higott 2004: 161). Zelikow's approach, which focuses on the question of the adjustments to be made in US national security policy, fails to notice such dynamics that render globalised security different from what the world has witnessed before. Accordingly, he fails to see the need to look at the state-civil society complex when analysing the security dimension of globalisation.

The weight of the traditional approach on the strategic mindset is so strong that even those works that are otherwise critical of it fail to escape it fully. Many build on earlier assumptions, such as Robert Jackson's focus on the extent to which international society should intervene in 'quasi-' or 'failed states' to restore domestic conditions of security and freedom (Jackson 1990). The notion of some form of international trusteeship for former colonies has therefore been entertained that would be designed to control the "chaos and barbarism from within" such "incorrigibly delinquent countries" as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti, and Sudan, and to establish a "reformation of decolonisation" (Jackson 2000: 309-310, Lyon 1993). Andrew Linklater has similarly stated that "the plight of the quasi-state may require a bold experiment with forms of international government which assume temporary responsibility for the welfare of vulnerable populations" (Linklater 1999: 107-108). In the opinion of some specialists, this is because "such weak states are not able to stand on their own feet in the international system" (Jackson/ Sørensen 2003: 283-284). Whilst the extreme scenario of sanctioning state failure has been contemplated, the common response is to rejuvenate forms of international imperium through global governance structures (Herbst 2004). Backers of a 'new humanitarian empire' have therefore emerged involving the recreation of semi-permanent colonial relationships and the furtherance of Western 'universal' values, echoing the earlier mandatory system of imperial rule.[13] In Robert Keohane's view, "future military actions in failed states, or attempts to bolster states that are in danger of failing, may be more likely to be described *both* as self-defence and as humanitarian or public-spirited" (Keohane 2002: 282). What

13 Ignatieff 2003: 17; Huntington 1997: 310; Fukuyama 2004:. 131-2, 140-141.

these views neglect, however, is how the expansion of international society and the adoption of specific Western norms, values, and property rights is itself linked to the international expansion of capitalism. For,

> "on the surface of it, the expansion of international society was measured by the adoption of civilised norms of international intercourse; underlying this process, however, were the surreptitious forces of capitalist accumulation and exchange, imposing the universal logic of value creation and appropriation" (Colás 2002: 126-127).

Such a tendency of neglect is evident in two recent articles by Audrey Kurth Cronin and Robert H. Dorff despite the authors criticising the prevalence of 'established mind-sets' and calling for a new approach (Cronin 2002/03; Dorff 2005). Needless to say, both authors' studies suffer from externalism and reductionism. Additionally, their analyses also suffer from another central problem, that of state-centrism. This point is worth emphasising because they both are firmly critical of the 'state-centrism' in existing US approaches to the problem of state failure (Dorff) and international terrorism (Cronin), which they view as having been exacerbated by the process of globalisation. Yet, in their respective analyses, neither of them succeed in moving away from state-centrism. For, while emphasising the need to look at actors other than states, they themselves look at these non-state actors in a way that is reminiscent of the black-box approach of the more traditionalist scholars. That is, they do not look at the processes through which these 'non-state' actors emerge, operate and transform. The problem with state-centrism, after all, is not only that the state is placed at the centre of analysis to the neglect of other actors but also that these actors are not considered as the dynamic relational entities that they are.

Beyond the phenomenal form of state failure—which is what much of the above focus on state failure is enamoured with—what needs to be given greater consideration is how the different logics of sovereignty and capitalism are intertwined which shape the structural conditions confronting postcolonial states—'failed' or otherwise. These contradictions are captured through the manner in which specific state forms *internalise* capital accumulation processes and associated forms of rule. The next section therefore asserts the necessity of a more nuanced approach to understanding 'state failure' that is appreciative of alternative forms of social organisation that arise within different historical processes of state formation and conditions of capital accumulation. In sum, a thorough historicisation of state formation processes in the 'non-Western' world is required that is cognisant of the political economy circumstances within which such states have evolved. However, this is not to recommend the view that states have a simplistically predetermined structural position within the world economy where "the world-economy develops a pattern where state structures are relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak in the periphery" (Wallerstein 1974: 335; 2004: 52-56). Nor does it entail acceptance of non-Western state identities such as that of 'protostates', held as reflecting an impasse in the relationship between state and society; 'lumpenprotostates', which 'manifest bizarre forms of arbitrary rule resting on the violence of armed thugs over an inarticulate majority of the population'; or the 'black holes' of governance in Somalia, Angola, Liberia, or Mozambique (Cox 1996: 218-219; Cox 1987). What is instead at stake is the need to

more fully relate an historical understanding of state sovereignty to the political economy of security (Inayatullah/Blaney 1995).

5. Sovereignty within Globalised Security

According to Mahmood Mamdani, following independence, the African postcolonial state comprised a bifurcated political structure in which the formal separation of the political and economic characteristics of modern capitalist states was compromised.

> "The colonial state was a double-sided affair. Its one side, the state that governed a racially defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an associated regime of rights. Its other side, the state that ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-economic coercion and administratively driven justice" (Mamdani 1996: 19).

The postcolonial state was therefore bifurcated due to the existence of a civil political form of rule similar to modern capitalist states, based on law, and concentrated in urban areas; and a customary form of power based on personalism, extra-economic compulsions, and exploitation centred in rural society and culture (Mamdani 1996). This distinct process of state formation and the associated form of sovereignty emerged within a global division of labour shaped by the expansion of capitalism and uneven processes of development. A considered appreciation of the contemporary nature of globalisation, security and 'state failure' is thus best advanced through an historical understanding of the *uneven* development of processes of capital accumulation within which different processes of production were *combined* in colonial territories (Rosenberg 2005).

This entails understanding how very different processes of primitive accumulation have unfolded within the framework of competing logics of sovereignty and territoriality linked to the emergence of capitalism and the international states-system (Harvey 2003). Hence a distinction can be drawn between ongoing processes of capital accumulation in the domain of advanced capitalist states and ongoing primitive accumulation in the domain of (post)colonial states facing different conditions of development. This process of uneven and combined development — involving uneven processes of primitive accumulation alongside combined processes of development — has contributed greatly to shaping state sovereignty and economic development in the non-Western world. In the latter, the age of imperialism suffocated the process of primitive accumulation so that the state became the prime channel of accumulation serving as a 'surrogate collective capitalist', for instance in Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Zaire, and Sierra Leone (Young 2004: 31). At the same time, though, "the distortions of the state are not just the result of the external dependence of African political systems. They also arise from the evolution of their internal stratification" (Bayart 1986: 121). Hence, "primitive accumulation … entails appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and supersession" (Harvey 2003: 146). This is where Jean-François Bayart's notion of 'extraversion' gains purchase in appreciating the general trajectories of state formation shaped by historical patterns of the uneven and

combined development of capital accumulation alongside the predatory pursuit of power and wealth tied to specific cultural routines, practices of social action, and social forms of organisation in the postcolonial era (Bayart 2000). Hence the "use of external resources to manage internal conflicts, alliances with foreign actors to strengthen central power, the transfer of the burden of foreign conditionality to the mass of the people, the instrumentalisation of conflicts among the powers to extract more resources" (Hibou 2004: 33). The point is that this focus on aspects of uneven and combined development that has emerged as part and parcel of globalised security is a much more fruitful, historically rich, and empirically nuanced way to understanding conditions of neoliberal globalisation, security, and 'state failure'. It is this alternative, historically-oriented, conceptualisation of the relationship between sovereign territoriality and capital accumulation that potentially offers a way of moving beyond unreflective assumptions of mere anarchy within theories of the international, shaping notions of statelessness in Africa and elsewhere.[14]

By way of illustration, factional struggles within and between sub-Saharan African states (Liberia, Rwanda, DRC and Uganda) would be better interpreted as the use of war as a mode of political production: a source of primitive accumulation that enables the seizure of the resources of the economy based on strategies of extroversion involving new claims to authority and redistribution (Bayart 1993: 74-75; Duffield 2001: 136-140). For example, the strategies of rebel groups in Sierra Leone in the 1990s such as Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaged in predatory forms of primitive accumulation through the seizure of resources such as conflict diamonds, whilst Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) similarly funded warfare through the timber, rubber, and diamond trade (Szeftel 2000). Also, in the late 1990s, the rebel Alliance for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, led by Laurent Kabila, played off the diamond cartel De Beers against one of its rivals, America Mineral Fields, concerning diamond mining contracts as well as contracts to mine copper, cobalt and zinc in just this fashion (Reno 2001). This arrangement is also somewhat mirrored by the intervention of the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force (UPDF) in the ensuing Congo war through which some officers of the UPDF managed to institutionalize their private interests and benefit from the predatory pursuit of primitive accumulation whilst simultaneously underwriting the Ugandan state's compliance with debt obligations to creditors within the global political economy. Long-term aims of state building, however, remain thwarted by the volatile balance sustained by these competing factional interests in the Ugandan state (Reno 2002). Elsewhere, the conflagration in Côte d'Ivoire, since 19 September 2002, initially involving the launch of an attack by army rebels on Abidjan and two northern towns, Bouaké and Korhogo, in an attempt to seize state resources, reflects again more the conditions of extroversion — the predatory pursuit of wealth and power through primitive accumulation — that has to be related to the specific historical experiences, cultural, ethnic, and political conditions of the region, rather than seen as an-

14 For a parallel argument seeking to extend a redefined relational theory of the state, anarchy, and the international to Africa see Brown 2006.

other case of a 'failed state'. Additionally, bodies such as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SSRC), set up on 1 April 2002 to establish a fourth Somali government in Baidoa, joining the breakaway regions of Puntland and Somaliland in rejecting the authority of the Transitional National Government in Mogadishu, is less an example of a 'failed state' and more a contestation over social and political organisation embedded within the above complex processes of historical state formation and capital accumulation. In sum, there is a need to shift the focus from pathologies of deviancy, aberration, and breakdown in relation to the analysis of 'failed states', in order to better appreciate the centrality of strategies of primitive accumulation, redistribution, and political legitimacy that unfold in uneven and combined conditions of development shaping postcolonial state sovereignty. This is needed not only to be able to understand the dynamics in 'other' parts of the world, but also in order to become able to grasp the dynamics through which the contradictions between the 'external' and the 'internal' have been constituted. The development of such an understanding is more necessary than ever at a time when discourses of 'globalisation' and 'state failure' are being employed to shape political processes 'at 'home' and 'abroad'.

6. Conclusion: 'State Failure' within Conditions of Globalised Security

On the 4 May 1898, Lord Salisbury delivered one of his most notable and controversial speeches as British Prime Minister to an audience at the Albert Hall, London. The 'dying nations' speech, as it became known, applied Darwinian principles to the emerging international states-system and the symptoms, causes, and threats facing Britain at the time. Salisbury argued:

> "You may roughly divide the nations of the world as the living and the dying . . . the weak states are becoming weaker and the strong states are becoming stronger . . . the living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying and the seeds and causes of conflict among civilised nations will speedily appear" (Greenville 1964: 165-166).

Imperialism was seen as a biological process that, according to the laws of nature, would lead to the 'curing or cutting up' of weak states, equated with ailing 'patients' ready for autopsy. Just as Lord Salisbury drew distinctions between 'strong' and 'weak' states in the international states-system at the height of classical imperialism, policy-makers and international scholars today are making similar assumptions about states outside the Western context. Evoking the medical metaphors of Salisbury, it has been assumed by William Zartman that "state collapse is a long-term degenerative disease" although "cure and remission are possible" (Zartman 1995: 8). Albeit with shifts of emphasis, states in the 'non-Western' world are still seen in a pathological manner as the main sources of instability and disorder threatening the security concerns of the 'West'. In this vein, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw spotlighted the perfusion of warlords and terrorists within failed states to the extent that he has 'no doubt' that the domino theory applies to the chaos,

disorder, and anarchy of 'failed states' (Straw 2002).

At a time when it was claimed that the post-Cold War order lacked an overwhelmingly dominant cleavage, the threat of 'failed states' has come to the fore of policymakers' and international scholars' concerns. What is new — and problematised here — is the attempt to fit the defunct 'national security' framework of the Cold War years to the context of globalised security of the post-September 11 2001 world order (Bilgin 2002; Bilgin/Morton 2004). As argued above, such efforts have resulted in a failure to grasp the dynamics of the age of 'globalised security' that we are living in. Exemplary of such approaches to security from within the policy world include Richard Perle, Chairman of the Pentagon Defence Policy Board (2001-3), who has maintained that

> "the struggle against Soviet totalitarianism was a struggle between fundamental value questions. "Good" and "evil" is about as effective a shorthand as I can imagine in this regard, and there's something rather similar going on in the war on terror . . . [that is] a battle between good and evil" (BBC interview of Richard Perle 2004).

Another, more recent example is found in the words of President George W. Bush,

> "The murderous ideology of the Islamic radicals is the great challenge of our new century. Yet, in many ways, this fight resembles the struggle against communism in the last century" (Bush 2005).

As with practice, the prevalence of this traditional approach is also apparent in the scholarly studies on 'state failure' in much IR literature. Statehood is assumed to be a universal order achieved through the acceptance of objective conditions of sovereignty shaped in the self-image of Western development. Yet, the argument here has raised the need to problematize such universally recognizable signs of sovereign statehood in order to highlight two things. First, there is the phenomenon of the 'failed universalisation of the imported state' that begs critical scrutiny (Badie 2000: 235). In particular, greater account has to be given to the relationship between sovereignty and capitalism that shapes state identities. This is proposed as an alternative to the hackneyed state-centric assumptions of IR and its externalist conception of globalisation. Second, there is the set of problems created by the US attempts to export 'national security states' to different parts of the world. Negligent of the inside/outside nexus in security dynamics worldwide, existing approaches end up being either 'externalist' (as with traditional approaches to security that focus on the threats to 'national security' coming from the 'outside') or 'internalist (as with traditional political economy approaches that focus solely on internal dynamics such as corruption and misuse of resources). Accordingly, these approaches both fail to capture the processes through which some states 'failed' while others declared themselves as victorious in the Cold War.[15] The predicament of the Afghan people is a case in point. The aim here is not merely to point to the irony in the fact that

> "the very same fighters who used American funds and arms to defeat the Soviets during the 1980s led the most important opposition to the United States after the mid-1990s, and that many of the Afghan warlords whom the Pentagon supported with air cover, money and supplies in the fall of 2001 once fought on the Soviet side" (Kolko 2002: 45).

The aim here is *also* to highlight that the US-led operation in Afghanistan has failed to bring peace and security

15 Compare Schweiser 1996 with Kolko 2002.

to this part of the world, where Pakistan has experienced further instability, fragile relations between India and Pakistan have worsened, the Afghani people has remained insecure, and the production of opium has continued with its global destabilising consequences. There is, then, a distinct failure in traditional approaches to questions of 'state failure' that precisely neglect the political economy of wars over primitive accumulation under conditions of globalised security. Recognising these rather different political economy processes of security is essential in moving beyond the increasingly problematic preoccupation of mainstream security theory and practice within international studies.

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