• Submitter Login
    View Item 
    •   Bilkent Repository
    • Scholarly Publications
    • Faculty of Economics, Administrative And Social Sciences
    • Department of Economics
    • View Item
    •   Bilkent Repository
    • Scholarly Publications
    • Faculty of Economics, Administrative And Social Sciences
    • Department of Economics
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions

    Thumbnail
    View/Open
    10.1006-jcec.2001.1743.pdf (130.2Kb)
    Date Issued
    2001-12
    Author
    Bac, M.
    Bag, P. K.
    Show full item record
    Please cite this item using this persistent URL
    http://hdl.handle.net/11693/13469
    Journal
    Journal of Comparative Economics
    Published as
    http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jcec.2001.1743
    Collections
    • Department of Economics [152]
    Publisher
    Elsevier
    Abstract
    We compare two alternative legal presumptions, one more pro-defendant than the other, with the objective of reducing bureaucratic corruption to any target level at minimum social costs, broadly defined to include law enforcement costs, trial costs, and verdict error costs. In the absence of collusion possibilities between law enforcers and offenders, presumption of innocence involves lower social costs for low corruption targets while presumption of guilt has a cost advantage for high corruption targets, Allowing for collusion enlarges the corruption range over which the presumed innocence rule will dominate. However, there are two possible exceptions to this outcome, namely, if the government's law enforcement budget is limited and if the offenders can be penalized only up to a maximum permissible limit. In each of these cases, presumption of guilt may become the cost-effective rule. J. Comp. Econ, December 2001, 29(4), pp. 722-748. Bilkent University, Bilkent 06533, Ankara, Turkey; and Department of Economics and Finance, Birkbeck College, University of London, 7-15 Gresse Street, London WIT ILL, United Kingdom. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
    Citation
    Bac, M., & Bag, P. K. (2001). Law enforcement and legal presumptions. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29(4), 722-748.

    BİLKENT UNIVERSITY

    Copyright © Bilkent University - Library Technical Services | 06800 Bilkent, Ankara TURKEY
    If you have trouble accessing this page and need to request an alternate format, contact the webmaster. Phone: (312) 290 1771

    Contact Us | Send Feedback | Off-Campus Access
     

    Browse

    All of BilkentCommunities & CollectionsTitleAuthorAdvisorIssue DateSubjectTypeDepartmentThis CollectionTitleAuthorAdvisorIssue DateSubjectTypeDepartment

    My Account

    Submitter Login

    Statistics

    View Usage Statistics

    BİLKENT UNIVERSITY

    Copyright © Bilkent University - Library Technical Services | 06800 Bilkent, Ankara TURKEY
    If you have trouble accessing this page and need to request an alternate format, contact the webmaster. Phone: (312) 290 1771

    Contact Us | Send Feedback | Off-Campus Access