Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Explorations on monotonicity in social choice theory 

      Doğan, Battal (Bilkent University, 2007)
      Due to Maskin (1977), Maskin-monotonicity is known to be a necessary condition for Nash-implementability. Once one classifies social choice rules as the ones which are Maskin-monotonic and those which are not, a ...
    • Explorations on X-self selectivity 

      Kerman, Toygar (Bilkent University, 2017-09)
      X-self selectivity of a social choice function is de ned as being self selective relative to the set of test functions X and all of its subsets. We explore the self-selectivity of social choice functions which satisfy ...
    • Majority voting rule and oligarchic social choice rules 

      Pasin, Pelin (Bilkent University, 2001)
      In the first part of this study majority voting rule for two alternatives and continuum agents is characterized. As in the finite agent case, symmetry among agents, neutrality between alternatives and positive responsiveness ...
    • Median rule and majoritarian compromise 

      Polat, Ali Oğuz (Bilkent University, 2013)
      In this thesis, we analyze the relationship between Majoritarian Compromise (Sertel & Yılmaz, 1984) and the Median Rule (Basset & Persky, 1999). We show that, for the populations with odd size, these two rules are ...
    • Two essays in social choice theory 

      Kaya, Ayça (Bilkent University, 2000)
      Solution concepts which implement only monotonic social choice rules are characterized in terms of a new notion of monotonicity pertaining to solution concepts. For any given class G of mechanisms, it turns out that a ...
    • Universally selection-closed families of social choice functions 

      Şenocak, Talat (Bilkent University, 2009)
      In this thesis, we introduce a new notion of consistency for families of social choice functions, called selection-closedness. This concept requires that every member of a family of social choice functions that are to ...