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    • Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for dynamic cheap talk and signaling games 

      Saritas S.; Yuksel, S.; Gezici, S. (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017)
      Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. For the dynamic scalar and ...
    • On multi-dimensional and noisy quadratic signaling games and affine equilibria 

      Saritas, S.; Yüksel, S.; Gezici, S. (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015)
      This study investigates extensions of the quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problem, which has been introduced in the economics literature. Two main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's ...