Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • Fundamental mentality in a physical world 

      Brown, Christopher Devlin (Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2020)
      Regardless of whatever else physicalism requires, nearly all philosophers agree that physicalism cannot be true in a world which contains fundamental mentality. I challenge this widely held attitude, and describe a world ...
    • Phenomenal concepts and physical facts: a dialogue with Mary 

      Kıymaz, Tufan (Filozofický Ustav SAV, 2019)
      This is a dialogue between an opponent of the phenomenal concept strategy and Mary from Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. In this dialogue, Mary, who has complete physical knowledge about what it is like to see red, but ...
    • Powers and the mind-body problem 

      Aranyosi, I. (2010)
      This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. ...
    • Un argument probabilistic pentruteza identitatii minte-creier 

      Aranyosi, I. (Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2009)
      In this paper I offer a new, probabilistic argument for the mind‐brain identity thesis, put forward by U.T. Place, H. Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart in the 1950s. After considering the epistemic, or conceivability based arguments ...