Now showing items 1-15 of 15

    • Analysis of a decentralized supply chain under partial cooperation 

      Güllü, R.; Van Houtum G. J.; Sargut F. Z.; Erkip, N. (2005)
      In this article, we analyze a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and two independent retailers. In each order cycle, retailers place their orders at the supplier to minimize inventory-related expected costs ...
    • Consensus as a Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game 

      Niazi, Muhammad Umar B.; Özgüler, Arif Bülent; Yıldız, Aykut (IEEE, 2016)
      Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral ...
    • Foraging motion of swarms as nash equilibria of differential games 

      Yıldız, Aykut (Bilkent University, 2016-09)
      The question of whether foraging swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic (or, differential) game played by N agents in one-dimensional ...
    • Foraging motion of swarms with leaders as Nash equilibria 

      Yıldız, A.; Özgüler, A. B. (Elsevier Ltd, 2016)
      The consequences of having a leader in a swarm are investigated using differential game theory. We model foraging swarms with leader and followers as a non-cooperative, multi-agent differential game. The agents in the game ...
    • Foraging swarms as Nash equilibria of dynamic games 

      Özgüler, A. B.; Yildiz, A. (IEEE, 2014)
      The question of whether foraging swarms can form as a result of a noncooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in 1-D motion is introduced and ...
    • Implementation via code of rights 

      Yıldız, Kemal (Bilkent University, 2008)
      Implementation of a social choice rule can be thought of as a design of power (re)distribution in the society whose ”equilibrium outcomes” coincide with the alternatives chosen by the social choice rule at any preference ...
    • Implementation via rights structures 

      Koray, S.; Yildiz, K. (Academic Press, 2018)
      Implementation of socially desirable alternatives can be thought of as a way to design power distribution in a society such that the equilibrium outcomes coincide with the alternatives chosen at each preference profile. ...
    • Inventory control under substitutable demand: A stochastic game application 

      Avsşr, Z. M.; Baykal-Gürsoy, M. (John Wiley & Sons, 2002)
      Substitutable product inventory problem is analyzed using the concepts of stochastic game theory. It is assumed that there are two substitutable products that are sold by different retailers and the demand for each product ...
    • Learning the optimum as a Nash equilibrium 

      Özyıldırım, S.; Alemdar, N. M. (Elsevier BV, 2000)
      This paper shows the computational benefits of a game theoretic approach to optimization of high dimensional control problems. A dynamic noncooperative game framework is adopted to partition the control space and to search ...
    • Market entry decisions: effects of absolute and relative confidence 

      Bolger, F.; Pulford, B. D.; Colman, A. M. (Hogrefe Publishing, 2008)
      In a market entry game, the number of entrants usually approaches game-theoretic equilibrium quickly, but in real-world markets business start-ups typically exceed market capacity, resulting in chronically high failure ...
    • Nash equilibria in claim based estate division problems 

      İnel, Abdulkadir (Bilkent University, 2014)
      Estate division game is an allocation of an estate between players based on a rule. In this thesis, we consider estate division games and study the necessary and sufficient conditions for division rules under which Nash ...
    • Partially informed agents can form a swarm in a nash equilibrium 

      Yildiz, A.; Ozguler, A. B. (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2015)
      Foraging swarms in one-dimensional motion with incomplete position information are studied in the context of a noncooperative differential game. In this game, the swarming individuals act with partial information as it is ...
    • Planar swarming motion under single leader as nash equilibrium 

      Yıldız, A.; Özgüler, A. B. (North Atlantic University Union, 2017)
      Two dimensional foraging swarms are modeled as a dynamic noncooperative game played by swarm members, each one of which minimizes its total effort during the journey by controlling its velocity. It is assumed that each ...
    • Power control games between anchor and jammer nodes in wireless localization networks 

      Sezer, A. D.; Gezici, S. (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2018)
      In this paper, a game theoretic framework is proposed for wireless localization networks that operate in the presence of jammer nodes. In particular, power control games between anchor and jammer nodes are designed for a ...
    • Swarming behavior as Nash equilibrium 

      Özgüler, A. Bülent; Yıldız, Aykut (Elsevier, 2012-09)
      The question of whether swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in one-dimensional motion is introduced and ...