Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Foraging swarms as Nash equilibria of dynamic games 

      Özgüler, A. B.; Yildiz, A. (IEEE, 2014)
      The question of whether foraging swarms can form as a result of a noncooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in 1-D motion is introduced and ...
    • Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for dynamic cheap talk and signaling games 

      Sarıtaş, Serkan; Yüksel, S.; Gezici, Sinan (IEEE, 2017)
      Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. For the dynamic scalar and ...