Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Design and analysis of mechanisms for decentralized joint replenishment 

      Güler, K.; Körpeoğlu, E.; Şen, A. (Elsevier B.V., 2017)
      We consider jointly replenishing multiple firms that operate under an EOQ like environment in a decentralized, non-cooperative setting. Each firm's demand rate and inventory holding cost rate are private information. We ...
    • Non-cooperative joint replenishment under asymmetric information 

      Körpeoğlu, E.; Şen, A.; Güler, K. (Elsevier, 2013)
      We consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its ...
    • A private contributions game for joint replenishment 

      Körpeoǧlu, E.; Şen, A.; Güler, K. (2012)
      We study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to ...