Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power 

      Bac, M. (Springer, 2000)
      Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the "strong" ...
    • On the informational content of wage offers 

      Bac, M. (Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2002)
      This paper studies screening and signaling roles of the offer wage and investigates its impact on matching efficiency. It develops a matching model of a large job market populated by observationally indistinguishable, ...
    • Order of limits in reputations 

      Dalkıran, N. A. (Springer, 2016)
      The fact that small departures from complete information might have large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs draws interest in the adverse selection approach to study reputations in repeated games. It is well known ...
    • Stochastic control approach to reputation games 

      Nuh Aygün, Dalkıran; Yüksel, S. (IEEE, 2020)
      Through a stochastic-control-theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games, where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our ...
    • A theory of trade concessions 

      Bac, M.; Raff, H. (Elsevier BV, 1997)
      We present a model of tariff disputes and concessions consisting of an infinitely repeated game under bilateral incomplete information. Given potential agreements to be reached through unilateral or reciprocal concessions, ...