Browsing by Author "Keskin, K."
Now showing items 1-19 of 19
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Bribing in team contests
(Elsevier, 2021-04-21)We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. Allowing for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort, we present the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered ... -
Complementarities and the existence of Strong Berge equilibrium
(EDP Sciences, 2014)This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities a la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is ... -
Constrained ellipse fitting for efficient parameter mapping with phase-cycled bSSFP MRI
(IEEE, 2021-08-05)Balanced steady-state free precession (bSSFP) imaging enables high scan efficiency in MRI, but differs from conventional sequences in terms of elevated sensitivity to main field inhomogeneity and nonstandard T2/T1 -weighted ... -
Contests over joint production on networks
(Wiley, 2020)We consider a network of heterogeneous agents where each edge represents a two‐player contest between the respective nodes. In these bilateral contests, agents compete over an endogenous prize jointly produced using their ... -
Endogenous reference points in bargaining
(Springer Verlag, 2018)We allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points, taking into ... -
Fatigue accumulation in dynamic contests
(Elsevier BV, 2022-02-28)We study a dynamic contest model where efforts exerted in previous periods accumulate as fatigue. As an individual's fatigue level increases, it becomes more costly to exert one unit of effort in the future. This creates ... -
General complementarities on complete partial orders
(Springer International Publishing, 2014)This paper proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium for extended (semi-) uniform g-modular games, i.e., non-cooperative games where the strategy space is a complete partially ordered set, and the best reply correspondence ... -
(In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games
(Springer, 2022-11-21)We construct a parametric family of (modified) divide-the-dollar games: when there is excess demand, some portion of the dollar may disappear and the remaining portion is distributed in a bankruptcy problem. In two extremes, ... -
Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions in first-price sealed-bid auctions
(Springer Verlag, 2016)It is often observed in first-price sealed-bid auction experiments that subjects tend to bid above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium predictions. One possible explanation for this overbidding phenomenon is that bidders ... -
Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model
(De Gruyter, 2019)Although most contest games are modeled in such a way that the outcome depends only on the efforts exerted by the contestants, what is arguably more important is the contestants’ effective efforts which may be influenced ... -
A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium
(Elsevier, 2013)We introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, ... -
Multi-player race
(Elsevier B.V., 2018)We present a model of race with multiple players and study players’ effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium. We show that, in equilibrium, once any two players win one battle each, the remaining players do not ... -
On the existence of berge equilibrium: an order theoretic approach
(World Scientific Publishing, 2015)We propose lattice-theoretical methods to analyze the existence and the order structure of Berge equilibria (in the sense of Zhukovskii) in noncooperative games. We introduce Berge-modular games, and prove that the set of ... -
Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
(Springer, 2021-10)Strong Nash equilibrium (see Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987) rely on the idea that players are allowed to form coalitions and make joint deviations. Both of these notions ... -
Race meets bargaining in product development
(Wiley, 2020)We study product development in a firm, utilizing a multistage contest model (i.e., race) with an endogenous length (with one stage or two stages) between two workers. We model the payments to workers using the normatively ... -
Sabotage in team contests
(Springer, 2019)In the contest literature, sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent’s likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that, anticipating a possible sabotage, ... -
A tale of two bargaining solutions
(M D P I AG, 2015-06-19)We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier ... -
A territorial conflict: trade-offs and strategies
(Routledge, 2018)We study a war scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. Attacking a territory increases the chance of winning, but also causes harm, which in turn decreases the territory’s value (i.e. the reward of ... -
Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining
(Elsevier, 2018)We study an alternating-offers, bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair. Moreover, we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e., their ...
