Now showing items 1-14 of 14

    • Bargaining games with joint production 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin (Oxford University Press, 2012)
      This article outlines the literature on experimental bargaining and distribution games with joint production. The analysis of aggregate behavior strongly rejects game theoretical predictions and shows that at least some ...
    • Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Kocher, M. G. (Springer, 2019)
      We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargaining game with an induced reference point at the 2/3-1/3 distribution. Our results show that first proposals, concessions, ...
    • Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence 

      Kara, Tarık; Karagözoğlu, Emin; Özcan-Tok, E. (Birkhauser, 2020-07)
      We study the emergence of reference points in a bilateral, infinite horizon, alternating offers bargaining game. Players’ preferences exhibit reference dependence, and their current offers have the potential to influence ...
    • Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence 

      Kara, Tarık; Karagözoğlu, Emin; Özcan-Tok, E. (Birkhaeuser Science, 2021-06)
      We study the emergence of reference points in a bilateral, infinite horizon, alternating offers bargaining game. Players’ preferences exhibit reference dependence, and their current offers have the potential to influence ...
    • Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim; Özcan Tok, Elif (Springer, 2019-04)
      We study the salience and power of reference points in determining the effective anchors and aspirations in bargaining problems. Along this line, we enrich the analysis of the standard bargaining model with two new parameters: ...
    • Bribing in team contests 

      Doğan, Serhat; Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Elsevier, 2021-04-21)
      We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. Allowing for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort, we present the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered ...
    • Costly preparations in bargaining 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Rachmilevitch, S. (Blackwell Publishing, 2020)
      We model costly preparations in negotiations and study their effect on agreements in a bilateral bargaining game. In our model, players bargain over a unit pie, where each player needs to pay a fixed cost in the beginning ...
    • Endogenous reference points in bargaining 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K. (Springer Verlag, 2018)
      We allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points, taking into ...
    • Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Rachmilevitch, S. (Springer, 2018)
      We add a stage to Nash’s demand game by allowing the greedier player to revise his demand if the demands are not jointly feasible. If he decides to stick to his initial demand, then the game ends and no one receives anything. ...
    • Iterated egalitarian compromise solution to bargaining problems and midpoint domination 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Tok, Elif Özcan (Elsevier B.V., 2018)
      We introduce a new solution for two-person bargaining problems: the iterated egalitarian compromise solution. It is defined by using two prominent bargaining solutions, the egalitarian solution (Kalai, 1977) and the ...
    • Multi-player race 

      Doğan, S.; Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Ç. (Elsevier B.V., 2018)
      We present a model of race with multiple players and study players’ effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium. We show that, in equilibrium, once any two players win one battle each, the remaining players do not ...
    • Perseverance and suspense in tug-of-war 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Sağlam, Hüseyin Çağrı; Turan, A. R. (Elsevier, 2021-01-06)
      We study a tug-of-war game between two players using the lottery contest success function (CSF) and a quadratic cost (of effort) function. We construct a pure strategy symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, ...
    • Race meets bargaining in product development 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı (Wiley, 2020)
      We study product development in a firm, utilizing a multistage contest model (i.e., race) with an endogenous length (with one stage or two stages) between two workers. We model the payments to workers using the normatively ...
    • Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining 

      Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K. (Elsevier, 2018)
      We study an alternating-offers, bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair. Moreover, we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e., their ...