Now showing items 1-8 of 8

    • Computational modeling of vehicle radiators using porous medium approach 

      Çetin, Barbaros; Güler, K.; Aksel, M. H. (InTech Open, 2017)
      A common tool for the determination of thermal characteristics of vehicle radiators is the experimental testing. However, experimental testing may not be feasible considering the cost and labor-time. Basic understanding ...
    • Design and analysis of mechanisms for decentralized joint replenishment 

      Güler, K.; Körpeoğlu, E.; Şen, A. (Elsevier B.V., 2017)
      We consider jointly replenishing multiple firms that operate under an EOQ like environment in a decentralized, non-cooperative setting. Each firm's demand rate and inventory holding cost rate are private information. We ...
    • Multi-period supplier selection under price uncertainty 

      Şen, A.; Yaman, H.; Güler, K.; Körpeoğlu, E. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)
      We consider a problem faced by a procurement manager who needs to purchase a large volume of multiple items over multiple periods from multiple suppliers that provide base prices and discounts. Discounts are contingent on ...
    • New-product diffusion in closed-loop supply chains 

      Nadar, Emre; Kaya, B. E.; Güler, K. (INFORMS, 2020)
      Problem definition: We study the sales planning problem of a producer who sells new and remanufactured versions of a durable good over a finite life cycle. We investigate whether slowing down product diffusion by choosing ...
    • Newsvendor competition under asymmetric cost information 

      Güler, K.; Körpeoğlu, E.; Şen, Alper (Elsevier B.V., 2018)
      We study the newsboy duopoly problem under asymmetric cost information. We extend the Lippman and McCardle (1997) of competitive newsboy to the case where the two firms are privately informed about their unit costs. The ...
    • Non-cooperative joint replenishment under asymmetric information 

      Körpeoğlu, E.; Şen, A.; Güler, K. (Elsevier, 2013)
      We consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its ...
    • Optimal allocation with costly inspection and discrete types under ambiguity 

      Bayrak, H. I.; Güler, K.; Pınar, M. Ç. (Taylor & Francis, 2017)
      We consider the following problem: a principal has a good to allocate among a collection of agents who attach a private value to receiving the good. The principal, instead of using monetary transfers (i.e. charging the ...
    • A private contributions game for joint replenishment 

      Körpeoǧlu, E.; Şen, A.; Güler, K. (2012)
      We study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to ...