Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Existence in an overlapping generations model with production 

      Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila (Bilkent University, 1995)
      This thesis proves the existence of competitive equilibrium in an overlapping generations model (OLG) with production. In the proof, existence of equilibrium in the classical Arrow-Debreu Model is essential, and the ...
    • Extension of symmetric connections model 

      Taşcıer, Mehpare Şule (Bilkent University, 2010)
      In this thesis, we study an extension of symmetric connections model, which is presented by Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky in their paper entitled, “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks”. We examined ...
    • Majority voting rule and oligarchic social choice rules 

      Pasin, Pelin (Bilkent University, 2001)
      In the first part of this study majority voting rule for two alternatives and continuum agents is characterized. As in the finite agent case, symmetry among agents, neutrality between alternatives and positive responsiveness ...
    • On the existence of equilibrium in games and economies 

      Atlamaz, Murat (Bilkent University, 2001)
      There are three main contributions of this thesis in equilibrium theory. The first is about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games. We find sufficient conditions for the existence of ε-Nash equilibrium in ...
    • Party implementation 

      Apakan, Hasan Tahsin (Bilkent University, 2009)
      In this study party implementation concept is introduced. Party implementation is an extension of classical implementation allowing different parties to have group-specific choice rules. Members of a party are assumed ...
    • Theorems on double large economies and on the integral of banach space valued correspondences 

      Evren, Özgür (Bilkent University, 2004)
      In this study we analyze Pareto optimal and core allocations of an exchange economy containing a Banach space of commodities and a measure space of traders. We show that in such an economy E, if a coalition C blocks ...